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Abstract 
 The protests that occurred in the Conception Bay region of Newfoundland, 
specifically Harbour Grace, Carbonear, St. John’s and Port de Grave, between the years 
1815 to 1840 indicate underlying tensions. Newfoundland’s working population 
collectively resisted the local officials’ decisions in response to their economic, political, 
social and legal conditions. The residents’ concerns were exacerbated by major changes 
that occurred in Newfoundland’s society, particularly the decline of the island’s fishery in 
1815 after the end of the Napoleonic War and in 1832 after England granted the residents 
Representative Government. At the same time, Newfoundland’s working population 
protested the island’s legal authorities’ actions because the fishing servants and families 
were frustrated that the judges viewed them as criminals. The protests included in this 
discussion are an anonymous petition that stopped the extermination of dogs in St. 
John’s, a series of servant marches against merchants in Harbour Grace, a sealer’s strike 
against the truck system in Carbonear, a demonstration against the gibbetting of Peter 
Downing’s corpse in Harbour Grace and a rally to reclaim Catherine Snow’s corpse from 
Edward Kielley in Port de Grave. The protestors successfully stopped Newfoundland’s 
judges from fulfilling their responsibilities because they did not support the authorities’ 
actions. Each of these protests demonstrates that groups conflicted with one another in 
early 19th century because they did not agree with one another over how justice was 
defined and how it should be implemented.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Between the years 1815 and 1840, Newfoundland fishing servants and families 
participated in several protests and acts of collective resistance that disrupted St John’s 
and Conception Bay communities’ everyday activities. In 1815, anonymous petitioners 
stopped the St. John’s magistrates from ordering the extermination of all dogs when the 
principal inhabitants feared that the recent string of dog attacks were spreading 
hydrophobia, or rabies, across the island.1 In the winter of 1816-17, the Harbour Grace 
fishing servants repelled the local magistrates’ attempts to have these workers shipped to 
Europe when the town experienced a major food shortage.2 In 1832, Carbonear and 
Harbour Grace sealers acquired a monetary wage when they organized a strike against 
their employers and their local suppliers.3 In 1834, the Harbour Grace townspeople 
protested the magistrate’s order to have Peter Downey’s gibbetted corpse displayed on a 
nearby hill.4 That same year, Roman Catholic protestors in Port de Grave stopped the 
local surgeon from dissecting the body of a convicted murderer, Catherine Snow.  
While each of these workers’ acts of resistance against law officials and 
employers were separate incidents, considered together they show a pattern of protest. 
The working people of Conception Bay responded to circumstances, either externally 
created by economic depressions, or internally manufactured by law officials’ decisions.  
                                                                 
1
 Colonial Office 194/56 [Reel B-685], 1815, 14-16. 
2
 Minutes of the General Sessions, Harbour Grace, 6-16 June. 1817. Provincial Archives of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, The Rooms, (PANL), GN 5/4/B/1, box 1, 93-105. 
3
 Linda Little, “Plebeian Collective Action in Harbour Grace and Carbonear, Newfoundland, 1830-1840,” 
(Master’s Thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1984), 157. GN 2/2, Harbour Grace 
magistrates to Crowdy, Jan. 21, 1832. 
4
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Workers perceived the latter as unjust attacks on their livelihoods. These acts of 
collective resistance demonstrated how Newfoundland’s fishery workers used their 
numbers and the threat of violence to challenge the authorities’ decisions that they saw as 
attacks on their livelihoods or to circumvent legal officials’ choices that hindered their 
economic power. 
Christopher English, a legal historian, argued that Newfoundland’s judges 
required the people’s support to make formal law function. When the people did not grant 
their consent, then they openly protested and criticized the magistrates’ commands. In the 
absence of a coercive state, particularly in the early 19th century, consent was necessary if 
the laws were to be enforceable.5 The law could not be enforced when people collectively 
resisted the authorities’ commands. These protests, however, show more than how 
Newfoundland’s legal system operated and how popular it was among the population. I 
argue that the court cases provoked by workers’ acts of resistance and protests 
demonstrate underlying tensions that different classes had about the colony. I examine 
these cases of workers’ resistance to show how they responded to their concerns about 
Newfoundland’s changing economic structures after the end of the Napoleonic War in 
1815 and political organizations after the colony was granted representative government 
in 1832.  
Workers responded to economic troubles in two ways. In some instances, the 
servant population wanted to preserve their traditional master-servant relationships. In 
                                                                 
5
 Christopher English, “The Development of the Newfoundland Legal System to 1815,” Journal of the 
History of the Atlantic Region, Acadiensis XX, 1 (Autumn, 1990), 111. 
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other cases, the workers fought against traditions to gain better access to the rewards of 
their labour when new industries were introduced into the island’s economy. The 
combination of workers’ preservation of traditional economic systems and adoption of 
new labour techniques demonstrated that people wanted to advance their position during 
a major downturn in Newfoundland’s fishery.  
The political struggles that occurred after Newfoundland was granted 
representative government in 1832 showed how religious and ethnic affiliations were tied 
to political power. Newfoundland’s population often divided itself between Irish 
Catholics and British Protestants, but this did not mean that sectarianism was the only 
cause of political strife for the colony. In different instances, working people and 
merchants clashed with one another as they competed for power, in some cases to gain 
greater rights or to protect their dominance. The last two chapters examine the protests 
against the execution of Peter Downey and Catherine Snow. They demonstrate that ethnic 
and religious groups, who often intersected, struggled against one another to understand 
their place in this new political order.  
Residents’ economic and political struggles show how classes conflicted with one 
another, and help us to understand the changing social order and legal systems. Workers 
either retained or gained new rights as they protested against the island’s elites who tried 
to maintain their own power through the courts. The workers’ economic, political and 
social struggles were each tied together as people exerted their power either bypassing or 
using the courts. While Newfoundland’s class structure was different than that of other 
parts of the British Empire, it fits with the larger pattern of protest that occurred in other 
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colonies.  In this way, the court records and the newspapers, which told of different legal 
proceedings, establish how these documents acted as a window into how people lived in 
Newfoundland and in the British Empire during the 19th century. 
George Rudé’s and E. P. Thompson’s work on crowd movements and class 
conflicts do much to describe collective action. Rudé argued that 19th and early 20th 
century historians assumed crowds were homogenous groups who were defined as a 
“disembodied abstraction and not as an aggregate of men and women flesh and blood.”6 
Scholars discussed crowds as if they were the same throughout the world, defining group 
movements as deterministic and formulaic in nature. Rudé argued that crowds were made 
up of people coming together under different motives to express their agency against 
authorities who threatened their way of life. While Rudé’s examples show pre-industrial 
crowds as reactionary forces, his work demonstrated how social history redefined the 
mob from an amorphous entity to a human movement made up of individuals. E.P. 
Thompson accomplished a similar task when he challenged how previous historians 
applied Marx’s base/superstructure theory to explain how groups acted. He showed that it 
was necessary for people to study the totality of society to understand why people acted 
the way they did.7 Thompson argued that individuals’ experiences represented a common 
lifestyle, while other historians saw history as a culmination of class struggle. Thompson 
showed how group resistances were human movements based on how people were 
concerned about different aspects of society.  
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I define collective resistance as individuals with different motives coming 
together to fight for greater rights or to defend their traditions or pursue common goals. 
In many cases, Newfoundland’s fishing servants and fishing families organized together 
because of the economic hardship, but other underlying tensions, such as social and 
political disturbances, also caused people to protest. This essay includes an analysis of 
the fishing servants’ and the fishing families’ efforts to collectively resist their masters 
and the magistrates’ commands that offended their sense of fairness.  
Collective resistance refers to instances and larger patterns of protest in 
Newfoundland. My singular examples look at specific causes, such as the economic or 
political struggles, but when they are placed together they show a larger pattern of 
workers concerned with how Newfoundland’s social and legal orders changed after the 
end of the Napoleonic War. I will be looking at both peaceful demonstrations, when 
people wrote petitions to oppose legal proclamations, large-scale protests when 
individuals used their numbers to disrupt communities’ every-day activities, and the use 
of groups to intimidate individuals into complying with what the workers wanted. In 
many cases, the fishing servants and families blurred the line between peaceful, 
disruptive and violent actions as they used multiple tactics to achieve their goals. 
Newfoundland’s legal system and its court records serve as a window into how people 
interacted with one another and how they identified themselves.  
 Acts of collective resistance demonstrated a group’s power, as shown by the 
workers who protested between the years 1815 and 1840. This was an important period in 
Newfoundland’s history, as the island’s population underwent major economic, political 
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and legal developments that changed how they viewed their respective group identities. 
This essay examines how the fishing servants and fishing families interacted with the 
law. I examine how Newfoundland’s residents acted as groups, and how these acts 
shaped their relationship with their masters within a developing economic, political, legal 
and social atmosphere.  
Were the fishing servants and families reactive or proactive when they 
collectively resisted? By reactive I am referring to when groups defended their traditions, 
such as the paternalistic obligations of masters toward their servants, against acts that 
bypassed their sense of fairness or decency. By proactive I mean protests that were 
designed to change the status quo to directly benefit the group, such as demanding that 
wages be paid in cash rather than credit, or to develop livelihoods in new directions. 
Answering this question would help to put together a picture of the realities of their 
economic and social relationships with one another and their paternalistic masters. For 
instance, did merchants hold all the power when determining credit and contracts with 
their customers, or were the island’s residents able to circumvent the traders’ 
monopolies?8 It is important to look at individual cases of workers’ and townspeople’s 
resistance efforts because each instance provides nuanced details about people’s lives 
during this period that an overarching and large scaled study would not be able to give. 
Particularly, each of these separate protests show that the fishing servants’ and families’ 
reactions to perceived threats against their way of life do not fit the earlier historians’ 
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 Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in Newfoundland, 
1785-1855 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 28-9. 
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descriptions  as being strictly reactive or proactive, such as how Gertrude Gunn and 
Linda Little described them.  
This research on Newfoundland’s acts of collective resistance has prompted other 
questions. First, how did external factors, such as falling fish prices, impact 
Newfoundland’s social interactions and people’s relationships?9 International markets for 
fish directly influenced the connection between Newfoundland’s cod fishery, its primary 
industry, and people’s social positions. This prompts an investigation to understand if the 
protests during the 19th century were influenced by the economic depression, or if they 
played a part in bringing it about. Secondly, do these acts of collective resistance 
demonstrate that Newfoundland’s fishery had a unique class structure?  
I have limited my discussion to St John’s and Conception Bay because that area 
offers extensive evidence. Sources include the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland 
located in The Rooms, the Roman Catholic Basilica Archives, and the Centre of 
Newfoundland Studies in the MUN library. I have collected court records, colonial 
documents, magistrates’ letters and newspaper articles from different publications that 
pertain to the cases of collective resistance. Each of these sources provided valuable 
information on the circumstances and the effects that Newfoundland’s working 
population had on the island’s society. While there are documents on the other districts 
available in these archives, these are not as extensive as the ones on Conception Bay 
because officials focused on events that occurred in the central court district, where the 
Supreme Court was located. 
                                                                 
9
 D.W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland (London: Macmillian and Co., 1895), 404. 
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Newfoundland’s court and colonial records were heavily biased in favor of 
Newfoundland’s principal inhabitants because these documents were written by the 
island’s elites such as the Governor, the Board of Trade, and the Royal Navy.10 This 
meant that the fishing servants’ and families’ perspectives were rarely directly 
represented in the official record. The workers’ collective acts of resistance were 
interpreted by the magistrates and the island’s principal inhabitants against whom the 
people protested. Early nineteenth century newspapers were also openly tied to political 
parties, religious denominations and social factions. This bias was reflected in how the 
editors of these papers interpreted the fishing servants’ and families’ protests. For 
instance, the Patriot’s editor supported people’s acts of resistance against 
Newfoundland’s government because he believed that the Irish population wanted their 
independence from British rule.11 Other editors, such as Henry Winton who edited the 
Ledger, saw the workers’ acts of collective resistance as dangerous riots that threatened 
the island’s society.12 As such, the fishing servants and families rarely gave their own 
accounts of their actions during this period, but the documents that are available are 
usable in piecing together a narrative that occurred.  
 This paper works with what the archival record does and does not say about the 
acts of collective resistance that occurred between the years 1815 to 1840. The research 
indicated that Newfoundland’s working population clashed with masters, merchants and 
                                                                 
10
 Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals, Law, Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699 -
1832 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 46-7. 
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 Patrick O’Flaherty, Old Newfoundland, A History to 1843 (St. John’s: Long Beach Press, 1999), 154. 
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legal authorities because these groups each interpreted the law as performing different 
functions. The fishing servants believed that the island’s law officials did not care about 
their opinions on how justice should be implemented, and they saw that these officials 
favored Newfoundland’s principal inhabitants. With no other options, Newfoundland’s 
working population took to the streets as a final defense against the administration’s 
efforts to change how these authorities acted in society.  
Historical Background 
 Newfoundland’s society experienced major economic, political, legal and social 
developments during the Napoleonic War and its aftermath. These changes caused people 
to identify themselves in new ways as the different classes, especially the fisheries’ 
workers, adapted to meet these new circumstances. As such, it is important to look at the 
historical background before 1815 and during this period to understand why these 
developments were significant to the acts of collective resistance that will be discussed.  
During the eighteenth century, Newfoundland’s economy and social life was 
divided between the servants, the planters and the merchants. The servants consisted of a 
small segment of individuals born on the island, and migratory workers from England 
and Ireland who were hired by the West Country merchants to labour in Newfoundland’s 
fishery.13 The planters, independent fish plantation owners, acted as the servants’ 
masters. They employed servants to work for the fishing season on the boats that they 
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owned.14 The planters, in turn, relied on the merchants to supply them with the necessary 
fishing gear and provisions to complete their voyages. In exchange, the planters would 
give the merchants their catch to sell in the international markets.15 Even though 
merchants monopolized imports and exports, they did not directly control how the 
servants and the planters worked in the industry. Power shifted between these classes as 
political, economic and cultural circumstances changed, yet the merchants remained as a 
dominant force in the island’s society.  
During the Napoleonic Wars, Newfoundland experienced an economic boom as 
the price of fish rose due to other international fisheries being closed and markets having 
limited access to this resource. Merchants extended further credit to their planter clientele 
to gain greater profits from their workers’ successful voyages. This allowed planters to 
hire larger numbers of servants and increase production of fish. After 1815, 
Newfoundland’s economic, legal, political and social relationships changed when a 
depression followed the end of the war.16The price of fish fell dramatically when the 
markets were opened to other nations’ fisheries.17 Planters who relied heavily upon 
servants’ labour became bankrupt when the magistrates expected these boat owners to 
repay their debts to their merchants and their employees’ wages. Planters who used 
family labour, however, were able to survive this economic decline since they did not 
have to pay as many wages. This caused a shift in how the fishery operated, as the 
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surviving planters became more reliant on their family members to work on their boats. 
As a result, the servant population dwindled when planters hired fewer migratory workers 
and the servants who were left on the island married into their masters’ households to 
gain employment. Fishing families dominated the fishery by the 1820s and the migratory 
fishery had been replaced by a residential industry.18 This did not mean that the servant 
population had completely disappeared at this time, but that their importance in the 
industry had lessened to the point that families dominated the operation of fishing 
vessels.  
The island’s legal system adapted to meet this change. In the late 1700s, 
Newfoundland’s migratory fishers and residents relied on the Royal Navy to impose the 
law. Newfoundland’s Governors, the commanders of the convoy, used their power to 
unofficially appoint naval surrogates from amongst their officers to patrol the island’s 
communities.19 While there were local magistrates, they held little authority in 
comparison to the surrogate judges. Yet, the residents welcomed the law and order that 
the Royal Navy brought to Newfoundland. The magistrates were limited by the law to 
only review property and wage disputes, while the naval surrogates could conduct 
investigations into major crimes.20 Residents saw the Royal Navy as having the authority 
and the means to bring justice to Newfoundland because it could use warships to patrol 
the outport communities.  
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 Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 37. 
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16 
 
 A reform party headed by Patrick Morris and William Carson brought public 
attention to the Royal Navy’s alleged abuses against Newfoundland’s settled population. 
The historian Keith Matthews argued that the reformers were not Newfoundland 
nationalists like those who fostered the American Revolution, but were Irish and British 
elites who immigrated to the island or were second-generation families from prosperous 
merchant families. They saw themselves as British citizens in a society that did not 
respect their position in the empire because Newfoundland was not a colony with its own 
government.21 The Newfoundland reformers emulated their British reformer cousins, 
because they saw governmental change as an opportunity to increase their social status.  
While the Newfoundland reformers may have identified more as British citizens 
than as Newfoundland residents, segments of the island’s population, such as the 
disenfranchised Irish, saw them as true Newfoundland patriots. Public support for the 
reformers reached its peak when Morris and Carson brought attention to the Royal 
Navy’s abuses against the residents.22 Both Morris and Carson argued that Newfoundland 
needed to adopt representative government to grant residents control over the justice 
system. The reformers accused the Royal Navy of brutality and incompetency. 
Eventually, the reformers’ efforts were effective in ousting the naval surrogates, which 
the Board of Trade replaced with an appointed civilian Chief Justice.23 The Chief Justice 
then appointed local magistrates to oversee the island’s legal system and marked the end 
of the Royal Navy’s reign as Newfoundland’s surrogate judges. Additionally, the 
                                                                 
21
 Matthews, “The Class of ’32: St. John’s Reformers on the Eve of Representative Government”, 87.  
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reformers’ efforts to demonize the naval surrogates bolstered their support from the 
public and newspapers such as the Patriot. In 1832, Carson and Morris accomplished 
their goal of bringing representative government to Newfoundland.  
The social, and in many cases the legal, identities of Newfoundland residents 
were tied to their ethnic and religious backgrounds. From the early 1600s to the late 
1800s, Roman Catholics in Newfoundland were not given the same rights or 
considerations as Protestants were by the administration.24 The British government 
curtailed people’s worship of Catholicism in 1697 with the Banishment Act and other 
measures, in which “Catholic bishops and priests were compelled to return to their 
countries of origin.”25 These restrictions extended to Newfoundland as the island’s 
Roman Catholic population were prohibited from practicing their religion. In one case, 
the Royal Navy demolished a person’s house because a priest held Catholic masses in the 
home. Tensions were also high between Catholic and Protestant communities, in which 
people divided themselves into separate communities.26 This religious division was 
emphasized by the growing economic and social stratification that occurred between the 
Irish and the English. A majority of Newfoundland’s Roman Catholic community 
consisted of Irish immigrants who moved here as fishing servants hired by the West 
Country Merchants to work in the migratory fishery.27 As the migratory fishery 
transitioned into a residential one, the Irish fishing servants permanently settled on the 
island and married into their masters’ families.  
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On the opposite end of the socioeconomic spectrum, most of Newfoundland’s 
merchants and administrative personnel were English Protestants.28 They had the capital 
and education to dominate the island’s government, while the Irish Roman Catholics 
worked to maintain their livelihoods in the fishery. An English majority largely made up 
Newfoundland’s administration since its inception.29 While Newfoundland’s early 
Governors, who were Royal Navy admirals, appointed both people of Irish and English 
descent as magistrates, these local justices were still mostly English. This practice 
continued when Newfoundland’s administration elected to have residents act as the main 
legal force, as the English in the government outnumbered the Irish. However, there were 
wealthy Irish Roman Catholics and poor English Protestants. Patrick Morris, for example, 
was a prominent Irish merchant who helped to establish the reformers in 
Newfoundland.30 
These religious and economic differences led to a social stratification that divided 
communities into separate Catholic and Protestant cultures. Power between the two 
groups was constantly contested, as both sides used legal measures and illegal actions to 
defend their interests. Keough argued that the Harbour Grace affray, for example, was 
caused by people’s ethnic identities, instead of their denominational identities, as other 
historians had argued.31 It is important to note that these majorities, the Irish Roman 
Catholics and the English Protestants, shaped how Newfoundland’s working population 
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 Ibid., 26-7. 
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and the island’s elites interacted with one another. This relationship often led to conflicts 
where individuals to large groups fought one another over perceived slights. Yet, the 
people involved in these conflicts often identified themselves based on their affiliations 
with several groups, instead of solely relying on their religion to define their allegiances. 
In 1784 Newfoundland’s and England’s administrations had lifted some of the 
restrictions that they placed on Roman Catholics.32 Bannister noted that after the end of 
the Seven Years War Royal Navy officials dealt with cases of Irish residents 
collaborating with French forces who occupied St. John’s. Tensions ran high between the 
administration and the local Irish populations as people were trialed for treason or other 
crimes. For example, “Esther Merrifield swore a deposition that she had been raped 
during the French occupation… [by] John Stackebald, who identified as an Irishman.”33 
The St. John’s magistrates had Stackebald executed for his crimes, but they declared that 
he was hanged for helping the French. Bannister points out that hostility between the 
administration and the Irish residents lessened to the point that the island’s government 
adopted a stance of toleration in 1779 towards Catholic practices. Eventually the 
administration made this a “grant of liberty of conscience in 1784.”34 Residents were 
given free rein to practice Catholicism and local officials no longer had to renounce their 
Catholic faith to maintain their positions. Yet, people remained divided as religious, 
ethnic, economic and social divisions became further entrenched. 
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As stated earlier, the workers’ acts of resistance were a part of a larger trend that 
was occurring across the empire during the 1800s. In Ireland, for instance, the United 
Irishmen rebelled in 1798 to retake their independence from Britain.35 While none of 
Newfoundland’s acts of collective resistance reached the level of violence that occurred 
in Ireland during this rebellion, some of the Irish residents may have carried the 
memories of this event with them when they immigrated to the island, and the Irish 
residents who made up the majority of the working population were distrustful of 
authorities because of the United Irish Rebellion. England’s workers also staged their 
own acts of resistance during the late 1700s that were similar to how Newfoundland’s 
servants resisted the island’s authorities. Thompson states in Whigs and Hunters that 
England workers protested authorities’ efforts to erode their rights to communal land and 
given to private holders.36 Newfoundland’s servant population acted in a similar manner, 
as discussed in chapter two and three. In both cases, the workers came together to protest 
the authorities’ actions that they felt impinged on their traditional and economic rights. 
In British North America, people engaged in politically motivated acts of 
collective resistance, much as the Catholic populations of Newfoundland protested the 
executions of Peter Downey and Catherine Snow. Scott W. See discusses how English 
Protestants and Irish Catholics fought one another in a series of riots in New Brunswick 
during the 1840s.37 See demonstrates that each of these protests was politically charged, 
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as groups of people were aligned by their ethnicity and religious affiliation to resist their 
rivals. Newfoundland’s Irish Catholics acted in a comparable manner, when they 
communally resisted the authorities’ decisions to execute Downey and Snow. They 
believed that the British Protestants who controlled Newfoundland’s government were 
biased against Catholic prisoners and unjustly condemned them to death. These 
comparisons show that similar underlying tensions were present throughout the Empire.  
The shifts in Newfoundland’s economic, legal and political systems changed how 
people related to one another. With the decline in numbers of fishing servants during the 
1820s, Newfoundland’s merchants relied on the fishing families and the credit system to 
complete the seasons’ fishing. This affects how we view the different acts of collective 
resistance, since groups with different backgrounds and identities organized together to 
resist their masters. For instance, in 1816 to 1817, the court records referred to the 
servants who demanded food from their local merchants as “rioters” or as a “mob.”38 In 
1834, this language changed, for example, when the court records and the newspapers 
called the protestors who resisted the magistrates’ orders to have Peter Downing’s 
remains dissected as “the public.”39 This suggests that the officials in the judiciary saw 
that Newfoundland’s residents inhabited a new social category. The judicial officials 
perceived people as either disrupting the public sphere or of being a part of it. As such, 
the identity changes that the fishing servants and families underwent during this period 
can be attributed to the changing structure of Newfoundland’s society.  
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Historiography 
 Historians have discussed how Newfoundland’s residents were often in conflict 
with one another. Groups defined justice in different ways, and they believed that their 
actions were fair, even when they conflicted with other people’s actions. This section 
discusses how historians attributed residents’ acts of collective resistance to sectarian, 
political or ethnic divisions within the population. The second part will look at how 
historians have applied class analysis of economic and social inequalities. I divided these 
historians into different categories to organize them around central themes that pertain to 
my discussion on workers’ acts of collective resistance. Each of these historians could fit 
into either category, but I feel it is important to group them to demonstrate certain themes 
that are important in understanding my contribution. What each of these scholars 
demonstrated is that the fishing servants and families expressed their agency as a part of a 
group and did so within the circumstances that they found themselves.  
 Newfoundland’s modern historiography is rooted in the 1960s when Keith 
Matthews challenged the island’s “traditional” historiography. Matthews stated that John 
Reeves and D.W. Prowse created the myth that the West Country merchants prevented 
the island’s people from having any control over Newfoundland’s development during 
the late 17th and early 18th centuries. 20th century historians, such as A. McClintock and 
W.L. Morton, accepted Reeves’ and Prowse’s ideas that Newfoundland’s development 
was subverted by group-conflict as merchant groups contested one another over 
economic supremacy of Newfoundland. Matthews argued that the West Country 
merchants were not the villains that earlier historians suggested. Instead, he showed how 
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the Devonshire merchants benefited from settlement.40 Matthews pointed out that earlier 
historians neglected to talk about large portions of Newfoundland’s history to continue 
the false narrative that the West Country merchants had subverted the island’s settlement. 
His argument gave further agency to the island’s residents and he showed that the 
merchants differed in their views. 
 Other scholars focused on particular moments to explain the rate of 
Newfoundland development. In 1966, Gertrude Gunn reexamined Newfoundland’s early 
19th century political history.41 Gunn focused on how the island’s elites, such as the 
reformers, the merchants and the magistrates, impacted their society’s development. This 
is both an advantage and a flaw of Gunn’s work. She showed that the principal 
inhabitants shaped Newfoundland’s political scene through their decisions, but she 
described the majority of the island’s population, the fishing servants and families, as 
capable only of violent protest. Gunn used also sectarianism between Catholics and 
Protestants to explain Newfoundland’s political instability after 1832, but this argument 
does not fully answer why people collectively resisted specific acts.42  
More recently Patrick O’Flaherty also examined Newfoundland’s political turmoil 
that occurred between the years 1832-1843. In 1999, he concentrated on Newfoundland’s 
elites to understand the island’s sectarian and party divisions.43 Unlike Gunn, he did not 
believe Newfoundland’s political conflicts or people’s protests were solely sectarian. 
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Unlike Matthews who argued that conflict was rooted in social ambition of English and 
Irish residents of Newfoundland who cared little about the local grievances, O’Flaherty 
looked more closely at the reasons people organized into groups to collectively resist 
what they considered injustices.44 He effectively showed that sectarianism was not solely 
responsible for Newfoundland’s turmoil, while he placed blame on the church leaders for 
some of the conflicts. He believed that other factors, such as a depressed economy, had 
created desperate situations and that people’s grievances were justified. O’Flaherty 
discussed the political impacts that the workers had on Newfoundland’s society, but paid 
less attention to how the majority of the island’s population influenced its political scene. 
These two historians show how the fishing servants and families did not hold equal 
representation in Newfoundland’s government, since principal inhabitants and merchants 
dominated the island’s politics.  
Neither Gunn nor O’Flaherty gives enough attention to how workers participated 
in shaping the island’s political landscape. My contribution shows that servants and 
planters participated in political development by using their collective power to establish 
a foothold in how the government decided matters. A dialogue, while often forced open 
by the workers, was established between the people and its authorities, where individuals 
voiced their common concerns about Newfoundland’s development through their actions. 
I agree more with O’Flaherty’s interpretation than with Gunn’s that external factors were 
significant in influencing how people reacted to certain matters, but it is important to 
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examine how internal constraints, such as sectarianism, impacted how groups related to 
one another and community cohesion.  
In 2009 Willeen Keough examined the belief that the Harbour Grace Affray, the 
most violent incident of Catholic versus Protestant violence in Newfoundland during the 
nineteenth century, was caused by religious tensions. She argues that the respective 
parties’ religious identities were a part of their larger ethnic identities.45 Keough argued 
that the Irish of Riverhead and the English of Harbour Grace considered their towns to be 
their ethnic territories. When the Orange Order marched into Riverhead, the Irish saw it 
as the English challenging their territorial rights and their collective power.46 Keough’s 
arguments might have been more persuasive, however, if she had defined the term 
ethnicity.  
In 2016, Kurt Korneski examined how people divided themselves into separate 
territories based on their ethnic differences and local economic factors. Korneski showed 
that different cultures colonized the island and how these groups lived next to one 
another, producing conflict and renegotiating their boundaries. Korneski highlighted that 
Newfoundland’s residents were not just reactive or proactive, but acted in accordance to 
their values.47 Compared to Gunn, O’Flaherty and Keough, Korneski is effective in 
showing how ethnic differences impacted the residents’ group actions. Where the other 
historians focused on one particular aspect of the fishing servants and families, Korneski 
                                                                 
45
 Willeen Keough, “Contested Terrains: Ethnic and Gendered Spaces in the Harbour Grace Affray,” The 
Canadian Historical Review 90.1 (March 2009), 30-1. 
46
 Ibid., 40. 
47
 Kurt Korneski, Conflicted Colony, Critical Episodes in Nineteenth-Century Newfoundland and Labrador 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 2016), 7-8. 
 
26 
 
discussed how their cultural, economic, political and social positions each influenced 
how the residents acted to the different circumstances that they faced. He offers the most 
complete discussion on how ethnic identities influenced the fishing servants’ and 
families’ collective acts of resistance. Keough’s and Korneski’s arguments are consistent 
with my argument that earlier group conflicts in Newfoundland need to be reexamined to 
illustrate how factors other than sectarianism were at play. For instance, how did 
changing economic factors determine how people saw one another as they competed for 
greater political representation? Ethnicity is especially significant to discuss in regards to 
sectarian conflicts because not all Irish were Catholic nor were all English Protestant. My 
study does not delve into how Irish Protestants or English Catholics were seen by their 
fellow residents, but their presence shows that groups were based on several identities, 
such as their class and ethnic backgrounds. 
Newfoundland’s Modern Historiography: Class Actions 
The historians discussed in this section wrote about the fishing servants’ and 
families’ class relations. These scholars all worked within the framework of British 
Marxist historians, and examined the fishing servants’ and families’ group actions as 
evidence of class structure within Newfoundland’s society during the 19 th century. While 
these scholars approached this subject in different ways, they were each interested in 
illustrating how people used their agency within the limits of Newfoundland’s society. In 
a study particularly relevant to my own, Linda Little asserted that Newfoundland’s 
fishing servants and families were not a working class, as Marx may have defined, during 
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the 19th century because they were a part of a paternalistic society.48 By paternalism I am 
referring to an economic system based on obligations, where workers and masters relied 
upon contracts for employment.49 Masters saw themselves as the patriarchs of their 
families, and their servants as extensions of their households. Servants were expected to 
fulfill their responsibilities to their employers by completing their contracts, and could be 
subject to corporal punishment. However, Brian Palmer’s definition makes it seem as if 
masters were in complete control of their workers, but my own research indicates that 
these economic pacts were rife with conflict over how these responsibilities should be 
upheld. In some instances, such as the Harbour Grace food strikes in 1816-17, the 
workers held more control than the masters because of their ability to organize together.  
 In 1984, Linda Little attacked the idea that Newfoundland’s plebeians, a term she 
adopted from E.P. Thompson to address the island’s fishing servants and families, were 
passive individuals.50 Her category and use of the term plebeian is not terminology that 
people in the nineteenth century would have recognized. People would likely have 
referred to themselves as servants, planters or merchants. She argued Newfoundland’s 
plebeians were not a just a group who only defended their traditions, but that they took 
action against their masters and the merchants. Little derived her argument from her 
research on the decades of 1830-1840, in which she illustrated how the fishing families 
connected through their culture of resistance that they adopted from their home countries 
of Ireland and England. Like Thompson, she saw paternalism as a time when people were 
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unaware of their common social and economic positions.51 Instead, she argued that the 
fishing servants and families existed as a proto-class, as the workers’ cultural traditions or 
heritage tied them together into ethnic communities. She stated that eventually the 
workers’ cultural connections would become intertwined with their acts of resistance and 
would be transferred into future generations, creating their class ideals.  
 Little demonstrated that the island’s workers were not passive. People used their 
crowd strength to make changes in their relations with those who had power over them. 
Little argued that the fishing servants and families held a common plebeian-culture, but 
not a class identity. On the other side, she asserted that the sealers’ strike represented a 
class movement and the beginning of the island’s class divisions in the 1830s.52 Little 
wanted to show how the residents’ actions changed, but her discussion would have been 
more effective if she talked about how their cultural identity translated into their class 
awareness. Little drew heavily from Thompson’s idea that paternalistic societies only 
contained proto-classes, when people were unaware that their economic power 
determined their social positions in Newfoundland. Little’s discussion is consistent with 
my argument that Newfoundland’s residents brought their cultures with them when they 
immigrated to the island and this influenced how they related to one another. Economic 
struggles were as much about class as they were about competing cultures, especially 
between the British and the Irish. I agree with her assertion that the servant population 
was active participants in how Newfoundland’s legal system developed.  
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 In a similar analysis, the anthropologist Gerald Sider also looked at how 
Newfoundland’s culture and traditional ties to Europe influenced how the island’s 
residents formed their class identities. In 1986, Sider proposed that “[c]ulture enters the 
dynamic of class…because it is where class becomes dynamic; where the lines of 
antagonism and alliance come together and apart.”53 He argued that the class or economic 
dimensions created the culture. He stated that Newfoundland’s cultural traditions, such as 
mummering, were based on the fishing servants’ and the planters’ reactive responses to 
the merchants’ oppressions. Much like Gunn, Sider presented the island’s principal 
inhabitants as having agency, but he did not see agency of the majority of 
Newfoundland’s population. He claimed that the fishing servants and families were 
powerless to directly challenge the traders’ control over the economy, and could only use 
symbolic acts, such as mummering, to protect their rights. However, my own discussions 
on acts of collective resistance show that merchants were not as dominant as Sider argues 
in controlling the economic exchanges and subsequently, the island’s social system. Like 
Sean Cadigan, I argue that workers played a larger role than Sider allowed. 
 In 1995, Cadigan responded that Newfoundland’s residents played a larger role 
than Sider allowed. He argued that Sider was wrong in asserting that the West Country 
merchants completely controlled Newfoundland’s development, and that these traders 
forced the island’s residents to use family labour. 54 Cadigan discussed how external 
factors, such as fish prices, forced Newfoundland’s residents to adapt to new economic 
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circumstances.55 For instance, when the price of fish dropped after the Napoleonic Wars, 
the planter households who used more family labour than servants for work economically 
survived this period and the demand for migratory servants dropped.56 Cadigan 
demonstrated that Newfoundland was not isolated, but was connected to the rest of the 
world. He argued that the servants used their group power in response to circumstances 
that harmed them. Cadigan argued that the planters were a reactive force that adapted to 
new economic circumstances. The inhabitants changed how they interacted with one 
another, and how they identified themselves, in response to these changes. He 
demonstrated how important it is to understand how external circumstances impacted the 
island’s development. At the same time, his acknowledgement of the residents’ efforts to 
elicit change in a merchant economy showed how the fishing servants and families were 
active in shaping their lives while being exploited for their labour. 
 Jerry Bannister, a legal historian, pointed out that Cadigan only used evidence 
from the Avalon Peninsula. In particular, Bannister found Cadigan at fault when he 
claimed that Newfoundland magistrates favored servants when masters brought their 
employees to court or that punishment was eliminated during the late 18th century.57 
Instead, Bannister pointed out that the magistrates did not universally apply the law 
across the island, but that they used their own discretion in many cases. Did 
Newfoundland’s residents experience the economic decline during the early 19 th 
centuries in similar ways, or did the Avalon residents face unique circumstances that 
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allowed them to adapt? Bannister’s and Cadigan’s views are reconcilable. As a legal 
historian, Bannister’s interests lay in different areas than Cadigan’s, even though both 
scholars focused on similar evidence from the court systems. Bannister is more interested 
in how Newfoundland’s formal power structures were established and administered.58 
Much like Christopher English, Bannister saw that the government required the people’s 
popular support to function. He used examples of residents’ protests as ways to indicate 
how effective the Royal Navy was in administrating the law.59 He argued that the island 
had an effective system of government since the Royal Navy officials and the local 
magistrates were able to quell people’s protests through peaceful or harsh measures. 
Cadigan, on the other hand, looked at how people interacted within these power 
structures. In many ways, these scholars’ works complement one another, since they both 
examined similar pieces of evidence from different perspectives. Cadigan indicated that 
fishing families developed on the Avalon Peninsula and Bannister demonstrated that 
these social and economic developments may not have universally occurred across the 
island. My own discussion is aligned with Cadigan’s and Bannister’s arguments that the 
fishing servants and families organized in reaction to local and external events that 
occurred around them. I also argue that Newfoundland’s working population took 
advantage of changing circumstances to push for greater economic and social rights that 
were created by these external circumstances, such as how the international economy 
shifted in new directions after the end of the Napoleonic War.  
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The cases of collective resistance I examine may be understood within the 
frameworks of Korneski’s, Little’s and Cadigan’s interpretations of Newfoundland 
history. I agree with their views that both internal and external influences affected how 
people treated one another. Irish and English identities persisted among settlers on 
Newfoundland. Their ideas of justice came from these two perspectives as they attempted 
to reconcile what was fair, based on what they experienced in their original culture and 
with their new identities on Newfoundland. The residents’ identities as members of 
groups were complex, as they could inhabit different perspectives when they clashed with 
the law.  
 Fishing servants’ and townspeople’s collective actions during the years 1815 to 
1840 show that they were united by their work in the fishery. The servants and families 
were not equivalent to industrial classes in London, but Newfoundland had its own social 
and economic hierarchy. The workers were aware of their common position within the 
island’s paternalistic society, and they used their numbers to circumvent official channels 
that were dominated by their masters to get their way. While people were able to petition 
their local magistrates on legal matters, the law officials listened more closely to the 
highest-ranking members of Newfoundland’s society, such as the merchants.60 The 
island’s workers felt that they were unable to trust the legal process and to have their 
voices heard by the administration. 
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Chapter Two: The 1815 Dog Petition 
 In 1814-1815 a group of St. John’s workers threatened the local magistrates and 
the Chief Justice, Cesar Colclough, to stop them from exterminating dogs. When the 
Governor was away, and with no representative assembly, the Chief Justice was 
responsible for protecting the public order from threats. The Colonial Office appointed 
Colclough to Newfoundland after he left his position as Prince Edward Island’s Chief 
Justice. He was a controversial figure in PEI’s history, as he was involved with the local 
proprietors who conflicted with Lieutenant Governor Joseph DesBarres and his 
supporters, the Loyal Electors. Colclough was friendly with what he considered the 
island’s genteel class, and supported their aims to gain greater property rights. However, 
in 1809, DesBarres and his loyal electors were “attacking the [absentee land] proprietors 
in the name of the people,”61 Colclough’s name was tarnished in PEI after this three 
yearlong conflict when he committed questionable actions to defend his allies. Before he 
left to oversee Newfoundland’s justice system, the Prince Edward Island’s residents 
considered him a defender of murderers and a person who beat his servants. When 
Colclough arrived in Newfoundland, he found himself beset by financial woes and what 
he considered seditious Irish factions who wanted to undermine his authority. Colclough 
continued to align himself with society’s elites while in Newfoundland, and this later 
caused him trouble as the records on the dog petition demonstrate.62   
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 A number of the town’s principal inhabitants and merchants had earlier 
approached the local justices to complain about the dangerous dogs that roamed the 
vicinity of St John’s. Work dogs were widely used to haul wood, for example, but when 
not being employed they were left to roam. While no official complaints were found in 
the records, one of the magistrates claimed numerous dogs had bitten them and that they 
were afraid that the animals were infected with hydrophobia, better known as rabies.63 
J.M. Bumsted suggested that the threat of rabies initially came from a ship that visited St. 
John’s.64 When the magistrates apprised the Chief Justice of this situation, he asked the 
Grand Jury, comprised of the town’s principal inhabitants, to investigate these claims.  
Bannister notes how Grand Juries were often formed by the residents themselves to be 
used as a means of local representation.65 In some cases, the local authorities empaneled 
Grand Juries to “try capital offences, treason expected”, such as the one Governor Francis 
Drake formed in 1750.66 The Grand Jury who approached Colclough was not involved in 
determining if a human should be executed, but the jurors were given the task to decide if 
the authorities should exterminate animal life. This demonstrated that Newfoundland’s 
Grand Juries had evolved. Colclough was aware of the seriousness of the threat that 
hydrophobia presented. If the dogs infected other animals, then people could find 
themselves becoming seriously sick or they could lose their cattle.  
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 When the Supreme Court next deliberated, on February 6th, the Grand Jury 
argued that the dogs in St. John’s had hydrophobia and they posited that a plan was 
needed.67 Colclough took the Grand Jury’s conclusions seriously, but the Chief Justice 
noted in his letters to the magistrates that he believed the issue had been blown out of 
proportion. The Chief Justice compared the elites’ fears to the same ones that London 
elites held about dogs in the past. Colclough referred to 1798, when London’s elites 
started a movement to exterminate dogs in the nearby area to stop the spread of rabies.68 
He wrote that London’s elites were never able to prove that the dogs had hydrophobia, 
much as St. John’s principal inhabitants were unable to. Instead, London’s and St. John’s 
elites relied on their political clout, such as their positions on the Grand Jury, and their 
combined word of mouth to produce enough complaints to force legal officials to enact 
measures to get rid of potential hydrophobia threats.  
 While Colclough doubted the seriousness of the threat of mad dogs in St. John’s, 
he enacted a plan that satisfied the principal inhabitants and the merchants. He ordered 
that any dogs found within St. John’s that was not muzzled or being used for sledding 
were to be destroyed.69 Colclough offered substantial rewards to any person who brought 
in dogs to be killed. His order did not affect other towns, but there was no way to identify 
where the dogs came from and people could claim the bounty by bringing in animals 
from other locations. The Chief Justice’s plan may have pleased St. John’s elites, but the 
fishing servants and planters who used the dogs for work were angered by this proposal.  
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 In response to Colclough measures, an anonymous letter was drafted in the name 
of the “poor of St. John’s” and unknown persons nailed it to the courthouse’s doors the 
day after the Supreme Court adjourned. The letter stated that the town’s servants would 
not abide with the law if it meant that their dogs would be killed, and it asked the Chief 
Justice to rescind his orders.70 If Colclough did not accept their demands, then the 
anonymous writer threatened that the “poor” would take to the streets to force the court 
officials to take back their orders. The writer noted that the Chief Justice’s proclamations 
was similar to preceding orders that English officials made before the Irish rebellion of 
1798, in which England’s authorities killed the Irish residents’ cattle because people 
feared that they were diseased.71 The anonymous writer compared Colclough’s 
commands to British officials’ oppressive measures against the Irish. It suggested that the 
island’s administration was continuing a pattern of unnecessary and unjust orders against 
the Irish people.  
The writer denied that the dogs had hydrophobia and insisted that these animals 
were necessary for people’s livelihoods. The servants and poorer families of St. John’s 
relied upon their dogs to hunt game during the colder months, and these animals would 
pull the sleds that brought the timber back to their homes.72 The wood that the dogs 
carried was used in the construction of buildings necessary for the fishery such as fish 
flakes. The justices’ destruction of the dogs would not only hurt the poor of St. John’s, 
but it would also limit the servants’ and the planters’ ability to work in the fishery. The 
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writer made it clear that that the servants, many of whom came from Ireland, did not want 
their rights trampled upon as had happened in the past, and they were taking 
precautionary steps to prevent this. The author employed a threat in the last line of the 
letter, in which the author stated “[m]ercy we will take, and mercy we will give.”73 The 
author insisted that they did not want to force the Chief Justice’s hand, but that the ‘poor’ 
felt that they had no choice in the matter.  
Colclough refused to give in to the anonymous petitioners’ threats. Instead, the 
Chief Justice announced to the local Sheriff that he wanted the writer and the person who 
posted the letter to be apprehended. Colclough offered a substantial reward for 
information that people brought to the court officials. He additionally proposed that any 
petitioners or accomplices to the poster would be pardoned if they turned themselves in 
and provided information on who committed these acts.74 Colclough wanted to show the 
public that the petitioners’ threats were not tolerated, especially if they used intimidation 
tactics to disrupt his orders. Colclough’s response demonstrated an important 
characteristic about the relationships between the justices and the different classes that 
resided in St. John’s. The principal inhabitants and merchants were able to get the 
justices’ attention by going through official channels. In particular, their status as high-
ranking members of Newfoundland’s society, in this case created by their wealth and 
their ability to control the cod fishery’s production, gave them greater clout in getting the 
magistrates to do what they wanted. This was illustrated by how some of the principal 
inhabitants and merchants held positions in the Grand Jury which convinced the Chief 
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Justice to exterminate the dogs. In comparison, St. John’s servants and the poorer planters 
did not have the same power to get the justices’ attention. The servants could complain to 
their court officials, but the island’s elites held positions within the administration.  
Colclough and the magistrates listened more closely to the town’s elites because 
the principal inhabitants had official positions that granted them greater authority than the 
fishing servants.75 British officials often chose to place the island’s principal inhabitants, 
including merchants, into positions of authority both because these people were often 
educated, and because their judgment could be counted upon to uphold the interests of 
property owners. Bannister noted that Newfoundland governors appointed successful 
fishing admirals and surgeons as magistrates because of their experience with the law and 
their educational backgrounds.76 Additionally, the merchants were involved with the local 
justice system, even though they rarely held official positions. Bannister also pointed out 
that the local administration saw the merchants as a source of public funding, which it 
used for the maintenance and construction of buildings necessary for the island’s 
government. When the merchants gathered together to form committees or to petition 
their local Justices of the Peace, the administration listened to their complaints because 
the authorities realized that they needed these traders to keep Newfoundland’s economy 
and government running.  
This interdependent relationship was exemplified by Benjamin Lester’s 
relationship with the naval surrogates and Governor Palliser during 1767. Lester was a 
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prominent merchant who held significant shares in Newfoundland’s fishery along with 
his brother Isaac, and who oversaw the English side of their family business venture.77 As 
a former magistrate in Trinity, Lester was familiar with the legal authorities, especially 
the naval commodores and governors that visited the island during the summer. For 
instance, Commodore Albright visited Lester to have tea with the merchant and to deliver 
a personal letter from Governor Palliser.78 Merchants’ and legal authorities’ social circles 
often included one another. As such, the “[m]erchants influenced but [they did] not 
control” Newfoundland’s legal system.79The town’s elites had greater access to official 
channels since they operated within the system, while the servants were left outside of it 
to petition their local magistrates and hope that the justices listened to their pleas. If 
petitions did not work, the workers used protests to circumvent the courts and to change 
how the law functioned. The Chief Justice, and the local magistrates, trusted the elites’ 
word over that of the town’s servants and poorer planters, because the judicial officials 
were themselves enlisted from a similar social class.  
Unfortunately, there are no extant records to determine whether the principal 
inhabitants were successful in having the town’s dogs exterminated, or if the servants 
stopped it from happening. There were also no records of people turning in the writer and 
the poster of the petition, or any further information on these suspects. The lack of 
evidence suggests that the elites were unsuccessful in their plan to have the dogs removed 
from St. John’s. If the authorities’ plan was successful there would be documentation on 
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people being paid for bringing in animals to be destroyed, correspondence on the success 
of this plan and appeals for compensation. If the petitioners were not bluffing, there 
would also be evidence of protests against the Supreme Court officials for killing their 
dogs.   
Colclough’s documented concerns about Irish rowdiness suggest another 
dimension to this incident, since he inferred from the petitioners’ allusion to the Irish 
rebellion that they were immigrants from Ireland.80 The Chief Justice stated in different 
letters that the Irish Catholics were causing trouble in Conception Bay by rioting. It is 
hard to determine if Colclough was correct in his claim that these riots consisted solely of 
Irish servants but not servants of English background, because he did not present any 
evidence to prove his point.81 Colclough’s letters demonstrate his paranoia of Irish 
Catholics, and his biases that these people were naturally seditious. The Chief Justice’s 
family was a part of the Irish Protestant elites. Bumsted stated that his family’s 
participation in Ireland’s politics led Colclough to support the “English government in its 
suppression of the Irish Rebellion of 1798.”82 Colclough’s suspicions of Irish Catholics 
led him to suspect that these people were behind every protest and that they were 
undermining his authority. What the Chief Justice’s letters suggest is that it is possible 
that the extermination of the dogs may have happened, and that groups of servants were 
protesting against these unfair laws. Yet, Colclough never stated in a majority of the 
cases why these people were protesting, only that he believed that it was the Irish causing 
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trouble. Therefore, the lack of documentation about the consequences of his plan to 
exterminate the dogs and the later petition strongly suggest that the St. John’s court 
officials did not go ahead with their order, whether it was the servants who caused the 
authorities to back down or other factors. 
The available evidence also suggests that the St. John’s justices saw the fishing 
servants as a class who in the past resisted their orders. While Colclough acknowledged 
that it was likely only a small group of servants who were responsible for the dog 
petition, he knew that a majority of the town’s servants were unhappy with this plan.83 
The Chief Justice and the court officials worried that the servants would wreak havoc on 
the town if their dogs were killed. This runs contrary to Little’s argument that the 
servants did not constitute as a class because they did not have an ingrained history of 
resistance. The Chief Justice’s reaction shows that he considered the servants did have 
this history, whether he experienced the workers’ acts of collective resistance during his 
time in Newfoundland or elsewhere in the British Empire. 
Little did not suggest that the fishing servants drew their sense of class from their 
previous homelands or their cultural roots, such as the Irish’s resistance to British rule. 
The  references to the Irish rebellion in the letter supports the idea that the petitioners saw 
the similarities between the Chief Justice’s plan to exterminate the town’s dogs and the 
British officials’ decision to kill Ireland’s cattle. The anonymous petitioners did not trust 
the Grand Jury’s, or the Chief Justice’s, decisions because they saw that the elites were 
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oppressing them by depriving them of a valuable asset, as Protestant elites had in Ireland. 
The servants believed that the principal inhabitants and the justices colluded with one 
another because they came from the same backgrounds. The elites and the administration, 
on the other hand, believed that the dogs posed a threat to the town and that something 
needed to be done. Both groups had valid reasons for their actions and each saw the other 
as infringing on their ideas of what was fair, and how the potential threat of dogs infected 
with hydrophobia should have been handled.  
This was not clearly a conflict between St. John’s elites and the popular classes. It 
is impossible to tell from the extant documentation who exactly made the complaints to 
the Justices or who wrote the anonymous petition. It cannot be fully established if all of 
the town’s elites wanted the dogs exterminated, or if all of the servants objected. What 
most likely occurred was that small segments of both classes acted on their own, which 
impacted their respective groups. What can be established was that Colclough acted upon 
the complaints that the dogs represented a threat.84 Despite the petitioners’ threats in their 
letter, Colclough ignored the distress that his actions caused to the servants. The available 
evidence shows that Colclough enacted a law that harmed the most vulnerable people in 
St. John’s, the town’s poor, to ease the principal members’ fears. Without their dogs, the 
servants would have found themselves at a severe disadvantage while trying to survive 
the winter. While Colclough did not intend to specifically damage the servants’ 
livelihoods, his actions demonstrated how court officials were more likely to listen to the 
island’s principal inhabitants’ grievances. 
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The servants’ petition was a reactive demonstration against the principal 
inhabitants’ actions, and one that reminded them of how British officials oppressed them 
in the past. This case illustrates that the servants had an ingrained awareness of 
oppression from legal officials, and an idea of how they might respond. On the other side, 
the elites acknowledged that the servants had a history of resistance against their 
decisions. The 1815 dog petition incident supports my argument that the St. John’s 
servants, particularly the Irish who had memories of dealing with an English state, were 
class conscious because of their history of oppression and resistance. Even though not all 
of the servants in the Conception Bay region, let alone St. John’s, were Irish, a large 
majority of them came from Ireland.85 In this case, the English and Irish servants in St. 
John’s banded together because the Chief Justice’s decision harmed all of them. While it 
is impossible to determine who exactly wrote the dog petition, the court officials’ 
response to the letter, and the community’s failure to turn the creators in to the 
authorities, demonstrated how the servants were resolved to resist Colclough’s decision.  
The St. John’s administration and the fishing servants distrusted one another, and 
these events occurred during a period of economic hardship. The two groups disagreed 
over what should be done about the potential threat of rabid dogs, and what they 
considered fair treatment. The town’s law officials believed the principal inhabitants’ 
complaints, and saw that something needed to be done. While the evidence showed that 
the legal authorities favored the principal inhabitants’ opinions of the town’s working 
population. The fishing servants, on the other hand, believed that the magistrates unfairly 
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targeted their livelihoods, because they relied on the dogs to haul wood. As we will see in 
the other cases I will discuss, times of crises during the nineteenth century revealed that 
Conception Bay’s population was at odds with one another because different factions did 
not trust one another. They interpreted what was fair in different ways. 
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Chapter Three: 1816-17, Harbour Grace Food Riots 
 People’s reaction to Colclough’s measures against dogs was not unique. The 
following year, in 1816-17, Harbour Grace’s fishing servants rallied to protest what they 
believed was unjust conditions set by Matthew Stevenson during the town’s starvation 
crisis. Cadigan examined this series of protests, and argued that the fishing servants were 
able to organize themselves into large groups to defend their traditions from what they 
saw as the elites’ harming their livelihoods.86 He suggested that Newfoundland’s fishing 
servants held common values, especially about how justice should be implemented. They 
believed that the law should fairly treat the majority of people. The servants’ belief was 
part of a paternalistic system of obligations. By paternalism I am referring to an 
economic system where workers relied on their masters or employers to provide them 
with their necessities of life and employment.87 Masters saw themselves as the patriarchs 
of their families, and their servants as extensions of their households. Little asserted that 
Newfoundland’s fishing servants and families in Conception Bay did not constitute as a 
working class during the early 19th century because they were a paternalistic society.88 
Cadigan disagreed with Little’s assertion that the fishing servants had not developed a 
class until later in this period.89  
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While Cadigan and Little differed on the nature of the fishing servants’ class-
consciousness, they both argued that the workers’ acts of collective resistance were 
effective. Much like the anonymous petitioners in St John’s the previous year, the 1816-
17 Harbour Grace food rioters organized in response to the local justices’ actions that 
impacted their livelihoods. After 1815, Newfoundland experienced a major post war 
economic depression. Newfoundland’s reliance on the cod and seal fisheries made its 
economy volatile, since the price of fish was vulnerable to foreign influences. D.W. 
Prowse demonstrated this crisis by noting that when Britain made peace with America in 
1814 and with France in 1815, that fish was “selling for less sometimes than one-third of 
its cost to the merchant.”90 Both French and American fishermen re-entered the fishery, 
which limited the British dominance in waters near the island and the markets in Europe. 
Newfoundland’s residential fishery also competed with Norwegian fishers, which 
reduced the price of the island’s catch further. The international markets were flooded 
with fish and these countries refused to pay the same price as the previous year when 
Newfoundland was the only fishery that operated. Shannon Ryan noted that the price of 
fish dropped in the Mediterranean market, Newfoundland’s greatest buyer, from an 
estimated 42s per quintal to 24s 6d.91 Even though the resident fishermen caught a 
significant million quintals of fish, it was not enough to save many of the island’s trade 
houses from bankruptcy.  
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Newfoundland’s merchants were not able to get the same price in the markets, 
and, as such, they could no longer extend the same amount of credit to their clients, nor 
could they sell provisions at a lower price. The planters faced the worst burden, since 
island officials expected them to pay their servants’ wages and to repay the credit that 
they owed to their merchants during this economic slump.92 Newfoundland’s residents 
were unable to buy their basic necessities from their local suppliers. Prowse mentioned 
that “provisions were quite inadequate, and, to add to the general misery, emigrants were 
flocking in from Ireland.”93 The threat of starvation across Newfoundland was worsened 
when a major fire also devastated St. John’s, which left a majority of the city’s residents 
homeless and destroyed the storehouses of provisions in the colony’s principal port. 
While the years 1816-17 represented a unique combination of crises, 
Newfoundland’s authorities were experienced in dealing with emergencies. In 1785, for 
example, Governor Campbell “authoriz[ed] public relief because people had not earned 
enough in the preceding fishing season” to buy the necessary provisions.94 The 
Governor’s response had been prompted by the outbreak of food riots in Conception Bay. 
Bands of fishing servants across the Avalon came together to disturb the peace as they 
searched for food. Campbell gave the residents public relief because the merchants were 
unwilling or unable to grant provisions to the planters and the servants. Some residents 
and government officials proposed opening trade relations with America, which had been 
closed by the American Revolution. It was hoped that it would provide cheaper 
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provisions, and to alleviate shortfalls. In response, the merchants lobbied England’s 
Board of Trade against that measure because they wanted to maintain their lucrative 
monopoly on Newfoundland’s provision trade. Campbell’s decision to issue public relief 
ended the food riots.95  
While authorities sometimes responded to protests by acceding to the demands, 
on other occasions they successfully implemented plans that were unpopular. Harbour 
Grace’s food riots in the winter of 1816-17 are a good example, as the community’s 
fishing servants, planters and merchants found themselves in dire circumstances when the 
price of fish fell. As a major economic hub, Harbour Grace’s economy was directly tied 
to the fishery. When the price of fish declined across Europe everyone in the town fell 
into an economic slump. Cadigan stated that by 1813 “communities from around the 
island had already run out of supplies”, but the merchant imports had saved the people 
from starvation.96 This suggested that Newfoundland’s population was already vulnerable 
before the economic depression occurred, but that the merchants propped up the people’s 
provisions because they had the money to do so.  
By 1816, Harbour Grace’s merchants were unable to continue supplying fishing 
families. The town’s fishing servants and planters were also hit by this decline, since they 
relied on their local merchants as their main source of food and other provisions.97 Their 
masters could only use the fish that the servants caught during the season for sale in local 
or foreign markets. Palliser’s Act required that they signed contracts to ensure that their 
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catches of fish were sold in the foreign markets.98 Subsistence agriculture supplemented 
but could not fully replace imported provisions, which left the servants and the planters 
without access to food if their merchants went bankrupt or if they were unwilling to 
extend any further credit. While the servants and the poorer planters were unable to 
maintain reserves, the merchants who survived the economic downturn were able to save 
provisions in their stores or homes for the coming winters.  
With the onset of winter, Harbour Grace’s court officials faced an immediate 
crisis. There were not enough provisions to feed the town’s population. Matthew 
Stevenson, the local court clerk, responded to this emergency on November 6 th by stating 
that every planter and merchant was responsible for ensuring that their servants 
immediately left Newfoundland when the fall fishery was over.99 The courts ordered that 
the town’s masters were to withhold 4 pounds from their servants’ wages to buy their 
passage to either America or Great Britain. Stevenson believed that this would lessen the 
town’s population before the available food ran out. The clerk’s command was aimed at 
the fishing servants rather than their masters; Stevenson told these workers that they were 
not welcomed to live in Harbour Grace. The authorities’ language indicated that they 
viewed the fishing servants as a threat to the town’s peace and order, not as people who 
needed help during this crisis. The court officials saw the fishing servants as potential 
rioters, since past food riots had proved to the justices that these workers were willing to 
disturb public order if they were left without food.  
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Stevenson relied on the masters to solve this problem, since in the eyes of the law, 
they were responsible for taking care of their employees’ needs and controlling their 
behavior. Palliser’s Act emphasized the control that masters had over their workers by 
declaring that employers could hold back their servants’ wages if they disobeyed or 
deserted their responsibilities as stated in their contracts.100 Stevenson used similar tenets 
to state the measures masters should use to reduce the population before the town 
experienced a famine. Yet, the authorities advocated using punishments that were meant 
for criminals and disobedient servants to force law-abiding workers to leave the island. 
The fishing servants saw Stevenson’s declaration as a breach of their trust, since they 
expected their masters to look after them. The servants believed that their patrons had the 
responsibility to ensure that they continued their work and to provide them with their 
basic necessities. In return, the servants remained loyal to their masters. Stevenson’s 
order broke this relationship by commanding the masters to abandon their servants. The 
court’s reinterpretation of the law continued in their other attempts to solve the coming 
famine crisis and showed that they supported criminal punishment of law abiding 
workers to deter people from disobeying their orders.  
The magistrates’ earlier efforts to have the fishing servants removed before winter 
failed, so they called a second emergency meeting on 2nd January. Stevenson again 
ordered that the magistrates meet with the merchants and the principal inhabitants about 
the ongoing starvation crisis.101That afternoon the justices, the merchants and the rich 
planters decided that the “number of poor creatures now in a starving condition about this 
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town” was to be sent to St. John’s to receive a passage back to their country of origin.102 
This statement shows that the authorities’ earlier attempts had failed to lower the town’s 
population, and the clerk noted that the district’s provisions had reached a remarkably 
low level, and it was impossible for the officials or the merchants to feed everyone. 
Instead, the community’s elites decided to ship the population home to prevent people 
from dying of starvation.  
Captain David Buchan, Newfoundland’s Acting Governor, expected that the 
island’s economy would continue to decline in the coming years. The authorities reacted 
by increasing their restrictions on the fishing servants to keep the population of residents 
low for years to come, instead of temporarily removing servants from the town until the 
next fishing season.103 The court officials would only allow the servants to return if their 
masters authorized their reemployment.104 The authorities’ response to the food crisis 
showed how terrible the situation in Harbour Grace had become, and that they feared 
what could happen if they left the fishing servants to freely roam the area. Since the 
merchants were unwilling to use alternative solutions, the town’s principal inhabitants 
believed their only choice to save the town and their properties from being destroyed by 
rioters was to send these workers away.  
 The January 2nd meeting demonstrated that the fishing servants did not have any 
say on how to solve the crisis that directly impacted them. Stevenson indicated some 
fishing servants were present at the meeting, but the town’s principal inhabitants did not 
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ask for their employees’ opinions on the plan. Instead, the town’s elite saw the servants 
as “objects of pity” that were unable to help themselves and required their support to 
survive. At the same time, the authorities feared the servants, which demonstrated that 
Harbour Grace’s administration looked down on these workers as a problem that needed 
to be fixed.105 Stevenson announced that anyone who did not adhere to their orders would 
be flogged and placed in the gaol for the winter. Stevenson caused Harbour Grace’s 
servants to resist the local courts when the court clerk ordered that the authorities would 
use corporal punishment on workers who disobeyed the order to abandon the island. 
Newfoundland’s residents saw the magistrates’ use of corporal punishment, such as 
whipping, dunking (repeatedly dropping a person into the ocean) or branding, as being 
reserved for criminals. Bannister noted how the most common crime that incurred 
whipping was theft, which was followed by “assault to simple breaches of peace.”106  
Refusal to emigrate had been criminalized. The chances of criminals being 
whipped varied more by who the offenders appeared before in the courts, than the type of 
crime that was committed. For example, in 1786 Justices John Clinch, Jonah Howell and 
Geo. White heard testimonies about an altercation between John Andrews and Thomas 
Taylor. Andrews accused his servant, Taylor, of assaulting him on his Brigantine the 
William in front of his crew. The captain stated that Taylor disobeyed his orders about 
how to raise the anchor. Andrews did not tolerate this behavior and struck Taylor. Other 
crewmembers corroborated that Andrews and Taylor brawled in front of them, but that 
the captain was the one who struck first. The jury sided with Taylor because they 
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believed the crewmembers’ testimony. If the other servants had not testified, it would 
have been likely that Taylor would have been corporally punished for attacking his 
master. Additionally, the justices used a jury of Taylor’s peers, other fishing servants, to 
determine if the defendant was guilty. This likely played a major part in Taylor’s 
sentencing, since the servants might have been more lenient than a jury made up of 
planters based on their own experiences with their masters. The Taylor v. Andrews case 
demonstrated how justices’ used corporal punishment was determined by both their own 
discretion and in certain cases, the community’s choice.107  
 This case illustrates that the justices and the island’s population were 
continuously contesting the application of the law. This was especially the case for the 
interpretation of the master-servant relations within the law, where the legislation 
indicated that employers were allowed to whip their servants if they disobeyed. Yet, 
Cadigan showed that the Harbour Grace magistrates were lenient towards servants during 
wage disputes between masters and their workers. Masters did not always use whipping 
because the servants could cite this as ill treatment and gain more money from their 
employers. Sir Hugh Palliser, in 1793, stated that he regretted the creation of the 
Palliser’s Act because it granted “fishing servants freedom from discipline and 
guarantees for wages.”108 However, Bannister noted that Cadigan’s study was limited to 
Conception Bay and that justices from the other districts interpreted the Palliser’s Act as 
giving masters greater control over their servants.109 This shows that the island’s legal 
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system was not monolithic, and that magistrates from different regions applied the law in 
different ways to meet changing circumstances. Harbour Grace authorities’, specifically 
Stevenson’s, command to corporally punish any servant who disobeyed their orders may 
seem to contradict earlier decisions made by the same court, but the severity of the 
town’s starvation and the threat of food riots prompted officials to enact extreme 
measures to make people comply to their commands.  
 As Cadigan discussed in his analysis of this case, the court officials’ and the 
principal inhabitants’ plan backfired.110 The fishing servants considered themselves to be 
law-abiding workers who adhered to their masters’ contracts and who were now being 
treated as criminals because the economic problems forced them into a desperate 
situation. The servants felt that the magistrates crossed a line in threatening that they 
would be whipped for staying in their homes for the current fishing season. The servants 
believed that the authorities’ and the elites’ plan to have them evicted represented their 
masters’ failure to provide for them. The workers felt betrayed that their employers were 
not fulfilling their obligations. The principal inhabitants, however, perceived the fishing 
servants as a potential threat to public peace in Harbour Grace and to their own safety. 
The authorities’ decision to remove the servants from the town caused the reciprocal 
elements of paternalism to break down between the servants and their masters. Ironically, 
the magistrates’ efforts to prevent the fishing servants from rioting encouraged people to 
gather together and to march on the merchants’ stores for food.  
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 The next time that court officials recorded information on Harbour Grace’s food 
shortage was on June 16th, when an unnamed surrogate judge arrived in Newfoundland 
for the summer. The naval surrogate held a court in Brigus to receive complaints from 
merchants who were affected by the bands of fishing servants.111 (The Royal Navy 
convoy left each fall and returned each spring when the water was free of ice. This meant 
that many communities had to wait months before a suitable authority could hold a trial 
and to judge their legal troubles.112) Naval surrogates often experienced a backlog of 
cases when they arrived on the island. With earlier governors’ introduction of the 
magistrates, Newfoundland-based officials could help alleviate the surrogate judges’ 
burdens by holding trials for minor crimes that occurred in the winter. Yet, the justices 
were not allowed to oversee trials that concerned violent crimes or other malicious acts. 
The Harbour Grace’s magistrates were unable to hold their own inquiries into the food 
riots because the higher authorities, including the Governor, classified these crimes as 
above their jurisdiction. Instead, the community’s residents waited months after the 
protests occurred to have a surrogate judge investigate their complaints against the 
fishing servants. 
 George Best was the first merchant interviewed by the naval surrogate. Best 
recalled that on March 27th a group of servants gathered outside his home. He stated that 
this was the second time that he was accosted by this group; they had invaded his house 
to search for food earlier that month. This time the merchant conversed with the group’s 
spokesperson, either a Walsh or Ryan (the merchant was unsure), who “threatened to 
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burn his house if he did [not] open” the door to them.113 At first the merchant refused to 
comply with the threat, but the spokesperson cajoled Best further and he eventually 
relented. When the servants finished searching his home and they found no food, the 
spokesperson requested that they take a barrel of potatoes that the merchant’s partner, 
Charles Cozens, owned. Best allowed them to have the potatoes because he wanted to get 
rid of the servants before they damaged his premises. After a few days the group returned 
with “tenders of payment” to compensate the merchant.114 
 Best’s encounter with the group of servants revealed that the principal 
inhabitants’ fears that these workers would pillage the town were unfounded. Instead, the 
group wanted food and they organized themselves around this goal. This was 
demonstrated when they paid Best for taking Cozen’s food, which they saw as a forced 
transaction and not as stealing the barrel of potatoes. The fishing servants’ actions were 
consistent with the credit system under which they had operated since a time before any 
of them could remember. This illustrates that the servants wanted to continue to rely upon 
paternalist relations even as the merchants believed the economy could not support it. 
The workers saw the truck system as beneficial because their master provided for them 
during the winter. Even when the fishery faced poor markets, Newfoundland’s 
administration was able to avert economic and food crises by intervening, such as how 
Campbell used relief programs.115 The 1816-17 food riots represented a unique turn of 
events, when both Newfoundland’s merchants and its authorities were not able to 
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maintain paternalist economic relations. Additionally, the group’s use of a spokesperson 
to voice their demands to the merchants showed how the servants were organized enough 
to elect people into positions of leadership. This demonstrated that the servants acted as a 
collective to accomplish their goal.  
 The surrogate’s second investigation showed that while the fishing servants 
elected leaders, the different spokespersons conflicted with one another on how they 
should treat the merchants. The surrogate next heard from Cozens about his own 
encounter with the group of fishing servants on 26th March. He recalled how he “called 
Thomas Trehea and John Murphy…from among them” to ask why the rioters were 
gathered around his home.116 When Cozens heard that the crowd planned to pilfer from 
Best’s store the next day, he explained to them that his family required that food to 
survive the winter. Trehea and Murphy agreed with Cozens that to take his food would 
not be fair, but Thomas Walsh, another leader of the group, argued that the fishing 
servants had taken something from each house that they visited. Walsh insisted that it 
would not be fair to give Cozens preferential treatment because his family might starve, 
while the fishing servants had been hungry since the winter started. Trehea and Murphy 
compromised with Walsh by asking if Cozens could spare a sack of flour for the group. 
The merchant agreed, and he did not expect to see the servants again after this 
encounter.117  
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 Yet, the following day a different group of servants, led by Walsh, arrived to 
threaten Cozens for more food.118 We can speculate that these were the fishing servants 
whom Best encountered that morning, since they arrived at Cozen’s house at 2 o’clock 
that same day. Walsh threatened Cozens with violence if the merchant did not hand over 
the key to his potato cellar. The merchant asked if he could see Trehea and Murphy, who 
promised him that he would not be disturbed again, but Walsh insisted that he was 
Trehea. The group’s leader uttered more threats from behind the door and promised 
Cozens that the merchant would experience “Harbour Grace laws” if he did not open his 
house to the servants. Cozens eventually complied with Walsh’s demands, as long as 
only two of the servants entered his premises, but a “large body of them” forced their 
way in and struck the merchant to subdue him.119The group took a barrel of pork and 
when they forced open the cellar, they took several barrels more of potatoes that 
belonged to Mr. Best. As the group ransacked Cozens’ house, the merchant’s own 
servants arrived from the nearby woods and attempted to stop the group from seizing the 
food. When the merchant’s men failed, they retreated to rearm themselves with guns, and 
Walsh stated that they in turn would come back with more men to fend them off. Before 
any violence could occur, the real Trehea arrived and calmed the group of fishing 
servants down. Eventually the group departed and Cozens’ men returned to the 
merchant’s house. Cozen’s encounter with Walsh and his men indicated that not all 
servants wanted a return to paternalist relations. Instead, some of the servants wanted to 
express the anger and betrayal that they felt against the masters who had failed to avert 
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this crisis. The servants who negotiated with the merchants represented those who wanted 
the community to return back to its paternalistic roots, while the group who threatened 
Cozens signified those who wanted to lash out against their masters.  
 Cozens’ encounters with the fishing servants show that they gathered into groups 
to find food, which they knew that the merchants had set aside during the winter for their 
private use. In Cozen’s case, it could be argued that some of the merchants stored food 
instead of giving it out to the servants because they did not want their own families to 
starve. However, merchants’ actions during previous food crises also pointed to local 
suppliers hoarding food because they wanted to be paid for their provisions, instead of 
freely giving them out.120 Newfoundland’s economic crisis caused both the fishing 
servants’ quality of life to worsen and impacted how much monetary power the island’s 
wealthy elite had. This explained why Harbour Grace’s inhabitants wanted to ship the 
fishing servants off the island in this particular case, because they knew that the workers 
would visit their homes and stores to demand food that they did not want to share. The 
fishing servants viewed the merchants as their local suppliers and they saw it as both their 
masters’ and their suppliers’ duty to provide for them.  
 The fishers’ spokespersons had different opinions about how to treat the 
merchants. Trehea saw the merchants as a part of the community, who were not directly 
to blame for the fishing servants’ desperate circumstances, but who were also victims of 
the same circumstances. Trehea wanted the merchants to share their food. Walsh, on the 
other hand, felt that the merchants could not be trusted because he saw this starvation 
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crisis as their fault. His violent seizure of Best’s and Cozens’ food demonstrated that he 
believed that the merchants were greedily withholding food. While the fishing servants 
were organized enough to elect spokespersons to talk to the merchants, they were too 
disorganized to completely agree on how to act about the merchants. It also showed that 
there was not a single band of fishing servants going around, but that there were multiple 
groups that were roaming from merchant to merchant.  
 Thomas Robert’s experience with the servants exemplified the groups’ 
disorganization. Roberts testified that thirty servants surrounded his house on 26th March. 
Trehea and James Meddenon asked Roberts if he could spare any flour or bread for the 
starving men at his door. The merchant responded that he had “none to spare…I then 
went and showed the flour and the pork, they examined and saw what was there-
representing to them I was a poor man.”121 The merchant inquired that if he did give the 
servants what they requested, would they provide “security for the payment in what they 
might take.”122 Trehea and Meddenon stated that Roberts should ask the other members 
of the group, but that they would not take anything until they returned the next day. 
 When the crowd returned, neither Trehea nor Maddenon were there to greet 
Roberts. Instead, Walsh and Thomas Ryan threatened to break down Robert’s door if he 
did not let them search his home. The merchant complied and the group entered, rolling 
out a barrel of flour and potatoes. While some of the fishing servants returned with notes 
to compensate the merchant, Robert’s encounter with the fishing servants showed that 
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Trehea chose to peacefully engage with the merchants, while Walsh opted to threaten the 
merchants into submission.123 This showed how the servants were united together to 
stave off starvation, but that the various groups chose to use different methods to get their 
way. In this case, the servants sought credit at their local suppliers to obtain food, as they 
would have done when Newfoundland’s economic climate was stable. However, the 
crisis forced servants to adapt different tactics.  
 The servants varied in their tactics, but they were consistent in their use of 
numbers to threaten the merchants. On February 3rd, an estimated group of eighty fishing 
servants armed with guns and sticks marched on Port de Grave to plunder the town of its 
food.124 The merchants were made aware of their march the day before the servants 
arrived, when they noted that the town was not able to protect itself from this attack. The 
merchants talked with the crowd, but they were unable to deter the servants from coming 
to their town. The servants forced the residents to leave open their homes and stores for 
inspection. The merchants noted how each servant claimed that they were “in the greatest 
distress for want of provisions.”125 However, the traders concluded that the servants were 
lying because none of them appeared to be in poor shape. The merchants may have 
thought that the fishing servants were criminals and that they used the starvation crisis as 
an opportunity to plunder Port de Grave. This source should not be completely trusted, 
since the merchants opposed servants taking their food without paying for it. Yet, the 
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merchants’ experiences illustrated that there were some servants who took advantage of 
this crisis to loot people’s homes.  
 Whether the merchants’ observations were true is hard to say, since people 
aligned with the merchants wrote the court records. The extant evidence commonly 
presents the merchants in a favorable light, while the island’s poor were portrayed as 
seditious or too pitiful to live without their masters’ care. In all of these cases, the 
servants relied on their numbers to show the communities’ elites that their desperate 
conditions would not be brushed aside. If their masters and their local suppliers could not 
help them, then they would take what they needed by themselves. The fishing servants’ 
collective actions support Little’s argument that Newfoundland’s servants required the 
use of groups to have their voices heard.126 The protestors in these instances announced 
to the merchants that they would not be abandoned and that the masters still had an 
obligation to provide for their servants.  
 One question raised by the Harbour Grace food riots is: did the fishing servants’ 
actions during this crisis demonstrate that they were a plebeian population as Little 
argued or a class as Cadigan argued? The servants banded together because they wanted 
to maintain the paternalistic truck system under which they and their masters operated 
during prior fishing seasons. The servants’ collective actions show that they were 
influenced by their traditions and that they wanted to keep this economic system of 
reciprocal relations, even during the crisis. As such, the servants reacted to a food and 
patron obligation crisis that was created by the post war collapse of trade. From Little’s 
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point of view, the servants’ actions demonstrated the roots of a class movement that were 
beginning because the servants assembled their power together to make demands of their 
employers. However, Little characterized these group actions as spontaneous movements 
that were reactions to their immediate circumstances. She argued that to fully constitute 
as a class the fishing servants needed to unite against their masters’ exploitation of their 
labour. Cadigan, on the other hand, sees the fishing servants’ group actions as evidence 
that they were a self-conscious class. He argued that the servants were a reactive class 
who organized because of the common plights that they each experienced during their 
daily lives. The servants saw one another as having similar lives and they identified with 
one another because of their common economic positions. In the cases of the St. John’s 
dog petition and the Harbour Grace food riots, the servants demonstrated that they had a 
class identity. In these cases the servants acted as a collective who were aware of each 
other’s position in Newfoundland’s society, even if the examples discussed only showed 
specific instances in different towns, they both illustrate how the servants banded 
together to protect themselves from their social superiors.  
 The fishing servants protested against their masters and local suppliers because 
the two groups interpreted paternalism’s function differently. The servants saw credit as a 
system of responsibilities and contracts that protected their livelihoods in bad years as 
well as good. The masters and merchants, however, saw paternalism as a disciplinary 
device that ensured workers continued to labour in the fishery. The workers’ and the 
masters’ different interpretations of the obligations to each other impacted how they saw 
one another’s actions. The fishing servants believed that the administra tion’s commands 
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to ship them off the island on the behest of their masters was unfair, because they thought 
it was their employers’ obligation to provide them with winter provisions as they had in 
earlier years. On the other hand, the masters and merchants did not have the money, or 
the food, to provision their employees and they believed that it was best for the servants 
to leave Newfoundland. Neither group was able to agree, or had a chance to voice their 
opinions, on how to handle the crisis. The servants’ and their employers’ beliefs 
surrounding paternalism was formed by their past experience interacting with one 
another. This suggested that the servants’ and the masters’ class values were centered on 
what they considered to be fair or just interactions. Additionally, the Harbour Grace 
workers’ feelings of betrayal by their local suppliers demonstrate that the cod fishery was 
not just an industry, but that it was also a system of obligations between masters and 
servants. The town’s workers felt comforted that they could rely on the local merchants 
to provide for them in return for their labour. When the merchants refused to continue 
this social transaction, then the servants protested the breakdown of paternalism. The 
Harbour Grace food crisis and the workers’ subsequent protests demonstrate that the cod 
fishery was both an economic and a social system. In the next chapter, I discuss a 
challenge to that system in a dispute over wages in the seal fishery. 
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Chapter Four: Carbonear Sealers Strike of 1832 
In the early spring of 1832 between two and three thousand fishermen protested 
the truck system on Saddle Hill near Harbour Grace.127 This section examines a case in 
which the fishing servants came together as a class to demand better economic 
conditions, instead of relying on customs to defend themselves as in the two cases 
discussed above. The Carbonear sealers involved in the 1832 strike demonstrated that 
they were proactive, or in other words, acted on their own terms to change how they were 
rewarded for their labour. The fishing servants were a class that changed its nature and 
tactics depending on the circumstances that it protested, instead of relying on the same 
motivations and measures to protect its interests. In the cases discussed previously the 
servants protected their customary way of life, the sealing strikers wanted to better their 
lot. The sealers resisted the cycle of debts that fueled Newfoundland’s economy, and 
fought for access to greater economic opportunities, instead of defending their traditional 
rights within the paternalistic truck system. The sealers actions also demonstrated that the 
seal hunt, as a new enterprise, existed more as an industry organized along capitalist lines 
than as a system of obligations as was the cod fishery.  
To understand why the sealers acted the way they did it is important to discuss the 
sealing industry’s history in Newfoundland. Residents on the northern part of the island 
started sealing in the late 17th century when the inhabitants casted nets from the shore to 
catch harp seals. Shannon Ryan noted how an “estimated 150 resident English fishermen 
[were] scattered throughout the area of [present-day] Fogo and Twillingate” and how 
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wintering fishermen were inclined to hunt the seals when the ice-pans came close to the 
coast.128 This was known as the landsmen hunt, and the residents initially caught the seals 
for sustenance instead of for sale.129 By the early 18th century, the sealing evolved into an 
industry.130 As an international market for seal oil developed, the merchants paid planters 
to hire crews to voyage out to the ice flows that appeared on Newfoundland’s northern 
coasts and Labrador’s southern shores to catch the migrating harp seals. In 1723 the 
administration reported that Newfoundland’s sealers produced an estimated 500 tuns of 
seal oil valued at £12 each.131 While Northern communities initially dominated the 
sealing industry, Eastern residents entered the hunt during the late 18 th century. In 1848, 
Governor Le Marchant reported that a Spring Seal fishery was started in St. John’s, when 
a “merchant…sent two small vessels of about 45 tons each to search for seals” and they 
returned with around 1,600 seal pelts.132 By 1803, Newfoundland’s administration and its 
residents saw the winter and spring seal hunts were separate industries, instead of as a 
supplement practice to the cod fishery. Northern and Eastern communities engaged in the 
seal fishery annually, bringing back pelts and oil which helped to bolster people’s wealth.  
In comparison to the cod fishery the sealers only had a small window of 
opportunity to pull off a successful seal hunt each year. During the early winter, the 
island’s planters prepared for the annual seal hunt by hiring crews from the local 
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servants.133 The residents gathered provisions from their suppliers, who gave them 
equipment and basic necessities on credit. As in the cod fishery, both the planters and 
their servants became indebted to the merchants. When the early spring arrived, the 
sealers departed for the ice floes on board their masters’ schooners or, in later years, 
larger vessels built to handle larger crews. When the crews returned they sold their shares 
of seal pelts and oil back to the merchants to repay their debts. The crews’ shares in the 
profits of the voyage were based on the seniority that they held on the ship, which in turn 
was based on how much experience a servant had. For instance, youngsters or novice 
sailors received a lower share of the catch in comparison to an experienced ship’s 
surgeon or first mate.134 In rare instances the local suppliers paid the sealers in cash for 
their catches, but merchants generally provided credit.135 Paying cash in exchange for the 
seal pelts was vastly different from how the cod fishery operated, in which suppliers 
overwhelmingly only gave credit to their patrons. Instead of relying on debts, the sealers 
saw their work directly compensated as they earned cash that helped to supplement their 
earnings. For instance, fishers who participated in the seal hunt saw an average of “£20 
(about $100) to go towards paying” for their supplies which cost an estimated $150 in St. 
John’s and $185 in the surrounding Conception Bay communities.136  The crews’ work in 
the seal hunts represented a large portion of their annual income. 
Little argued that the merchants’ use of cash to incentivize the sealers to work 
harder provoked the sealers strike, since it emphasized the class divisions that existed in 
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Newfoundland’s society.137 Even though the seal hunt only took place for a short time 
each year, it generated a large influx of economic activity. This was especially the case 
for communities in Conception Bay. Before the sealing industry developed, the end of the 
cod fishery meant that all major economic activity on the island stopped until the next 
fishing season started. With the introduction of the annual seal hunt, people were 
motivated to stay all year long, since they could work in the seal fishery when the fishing 
season ended. While the sealing industry did not cause permanent settlement on 
Newfoundland, it attracted people to stay for work and allowed for growth of the resident 
population.  
It was apparent to the sealers that they received less money than did the planters 
and the merchants. Instead, the merchants gave the workers more credit and 
compensation. The sealers considered this an unacceptable practice, since they realized 
that they did most of the work and risked their lives, but hardly benefitted from their 
labour.138 The planters, in turn, were hardly generating enough capital to keep their 
businesses afloat, but the servants saw that their shipmasters were better off because they 
owned their vessels. While the crews had to divide their shares amongst one another, the 
captains or planters who owned the ships were guaranteed half of the remaining shares.139 
Ryan described how the captains’ wages had “increased at an even greater rate than the 
income of the sealers themselves had declined” as the industry grew since 1803.140 The 
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workers saw the merchants as the biggest offenders, since their suppliers were getting the 
most from the hunt by investing cash in the venture.141 
Even though this was an unequal transaction between the merchants and their 
clients, each relied on one another to perform their responsibilities during a window of a 
few weeks each spring. This provided servants with greater power over the seal hunt than 
their masters and local suppliers. While the island’s servants required the seal hunt for 
work during the winter, they did not have as much capital invested into this industry as 
the planters and the merchants did. Both of these groups needed the sealers to go to the 
ice if they wanted to recoup the large amounts of the money that they invested into these 
annual hunts.142 Since there were more sealers than there were planters or merchants, and 
the season was limited, the workers were able to hold the sealing hunt hostage by 
refusing to work.  
Compared to the anonymous petitioners in St John’s and the Harbour Grace 
fishing servants, the sealers faced different circumstances that influenced how they acted 
as a group. In the prior cases, the fishing servants banded together in response to what 
they saw as the administration’s and their masters’ failures to uphold their duties within 
Newfoundland’s paternalistic credit system The anonymous petitioners saw Colclough’s 
decision to exterminate St. John’s dogs as an unnecessary measure that would have 
caused more harm than good.143 Likewise, the food rioters saw the court clerk’s decision 
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to have them shipped off as their masters abandoning them when these workers needed 
their patrons’ protection.144 These two cases demonstrated how the fishing servants 
reacted to crises by defending their traditions because they knew that these practices 
protected them in the past. While the sealers faced similar harsh economic and winter 
conditions, they acted as a group to change how things worked, instead of protecting 
traditional practices to maintain the status quo.145 Their position was strengthened when 
they made clear that the seal hunt could not continue without their participation. In 
January 1832, the sealers placed placards around Carbonear announcing to their fellow 
workers that they planned to deal with the truck system. The placard’s author notified the 
sealers were to meet on Saddle Hill equidistant from Harbour Grace and Carbonear on 
January 9th to discuss what they should do to end their respective cycles of debt.146 
Cadigan argued that the fishing servants used democratic practices to form their 
resistance movements such as the servants in the Harbour Grace food riots sealers used a 
similar tactic.147  They gathered to decide their plan of action. This demonstrates that the 
sealers were conscious of their common positions as workers in Newfoundland society, 
much as the fishing servants had recognized each other’s plight during the starvation 
crisis. The major difference between the two groups, however, was that the food rioters 
gathered for survival, while the sealers united to fight to be paid in cash.  
The authors of the placards called the Harbour Grace sealers to join their fellow 
Carbonear workers in resistance against the masters and the merchants. The writer 
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compared the two towns’ workers to beasts of burden who were “both willing and able to 
shake off the yoke [of the truck system] they have so long and unjustly (tho’ patiently) 
borne.”148 In this case, the yoke was the debt that the sealers accumulated after labouring 
in the cod and seal fisheries. The sealers knew of one another’s economic situations and 
that they could change how the credit system operated if they united. While merchants 
faced their own economic woes, such as planters declaring bankruptcy when they were 
unable to meet their own debts, the sealers believed that their superiors were purposely 
stifling their opportunities to improve their income.149 Planters were only able to provide 
credit to their employees since they were unlikely to have cash to pay wages.150 The 
Carbonear sealers saw that the effects of the truck system not only affected them, but that 
it was a widespread issue that impacted the island’s workers.  
R.A. Tucker, the Chief Justice recorded in his letters to Viscount Goderich, that 
Harbour Grace’s magistrates saw the sealers’ meetings as a potential disaster. Tucker 
came from high-ranking parents in Bermuda, which allowed him to attend Cambridge 
and to study the law at Inner Temple. Tucker was appointed as Chief Justice in 1822 after 
Sir Frances Forbes left the position. When the Colonial Office first created 
Newfoundland’s Supreme Court under the Judicature Act in 1824, Tucker was appointed 
as its first Chief Justice, alongside Wallet DesBarres and John William Molloy, who was 
later replaced by Edward Brabazon in 1826, as his assistant judges.151 While each of 
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these judges was given equal powers, Tucker was given the responsibility to officially 
approve decisions.152 As the first head judges of Newfoundland’s Supreme Court, Tucker 
and his assistant judges were tasked with the “preparation of Rules of Court”, since the 
Judicature Act introduced new measures to the island’s legal system.153 Tucker served as 
the island’s interim Governor while Thomas Cochrane, the current governor, was away 
during the winter of 1831-32.154 He was a staunch opponent of the political reformers, 
and Tucker’s resistance to the residents’ efforts to govern themselves prompted him to 
resign from his position in 1833.155 
 Tucker illustrated his distrust in the residents’ ability to govern their selves when 
he mentioned to Goderich that the Harbour Grace magistrates were overreacting to the 
sealers’ meeting.156 He wrote that the local justices saw the workers’ gathering as a 
prelude to a riot. The magistrates based this assumption on their own experiences in the 
region; they stated that when large crowds gathered they aired their grievances to one 
another and incited each other into action. For instance, in 1831 a crowd of fishing 
servants in Brigus broke into William Danson’s store to destroy his barrels of fish oil.157 
Danson owed a portion of proceeds from the sale of the barrels to the servants as 
repayment for their labour. However, a group of St. John’s merchants called in their 
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debts, including that of Danson. The Brigus merchant was forced to repay his creditors by 
giving them his merchandise, including the barrels of fish oil. The servants saw Danson’s 
actions as a betrayal of his obligation to them because he repaid his debts to his supplier 
before he paid them for their labour. The Harbour Grace justices who presided over 
Danson’s case were troubled by the servants’ actions. The workers’ actions demonstrated 
to the magistrates that the sealers could not be trusted to follow the law, and they asked 
Tucker to send in constables to stop the meetings.158 Tucker did not grant their request, 
but he did express his own concerns about the sealers meetings.  
On February 9th, the sealers met again on Saddle Hill.159 Like their first meeting, 
the workers peaceably assembled, and this time they called upon the local sealing masters 
and ship owners to meet with them to discuss their agreements. Masters who worked in 
the sealing industry had to draw contracts up with their servants to determine what their 
employees’ obligations were and how many shares they received from each voyage. The 
strikers saw the current contracts as unfair. They believed that they were not receiving 
enough money for working in harsh conditions, while the industry’s investors 
prospered.160 Little stated that the “names of 78 masters were listed and summoned to 
appear along” with those previously called by the sealers to arrive at this second 
meeting.161 The strikers called the ship owners one-by-one to have them change their 
agreements to better meet the workers’ expectations. If the masters did not accede to the 
strikers’ wishes, then the sealers threatened to stop working in the industry. Unlike the 
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sealers, the ship owners did not pose a united front but acted separately based on their 
own interests. They could not effectively resist the sealers’ demands, because they 
needed the strikers to get back to work before the spring or they would lose their 
investments. As such, some ship owners and suppliers were forced to agree to the sealers’ 
demands and promise that the workers would receive more cash instead of credit. Other 
ship owners refused to cooperate with the sealers, however, and decided to ignore the 
strikers’ demands.  
Thomas Ridley, a Harbour Grace merchant, refused to meet the strikers at Saddle 
Hill and to amend his contracts with his employees.162 Ridley originally came to 
Newfoundland from England to work under William Bennett, his uncle, who had 
property in Carbonear. The two formed a partnership in 1824, and were later joined by 
Ridley’s relative, Thomas Harrison, to create the Thomas Ridley and Company firm. The 
merchants held their stores in Carbonear and moved their headquarters to Harbour Grace. 
Ridley represented a large business enterprise that influenced the economic environments 
of both towns and the sealers’ working lives.163 The sealers saw Ridley’s refusal to 
cooperate as undermining their efforts, since they required that all of the masters and the 
local suppliers agree to their demands. Ridley’s dissent threatened to unravel the sealers’ 
efforts because he was a powerful merchant and the other ship owners might have 
followed his lead by refusing to change the contracts or to go back on their agreements on 
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Saddle Hill. The sealers required that all the ship owners agree to their demands to ensure 
that the sealers’ new obligations were honored.  
Since the sealers’ initial tactics did not work against Ridley, they used different 
measures. On February 18th, Tucker received a letter from the Harbour Grace magistrates 
reporting that “a mob, to the number of at least one hundred and thirty men” attacked 
Ridley’s property and destroyed his schooner, The Perseverance.164They believed that the 
group was related to the sealers, and that this was retaliation against Ridley’s refusal to 
meet with them. The local Justices were nervous about these developments because they 
believed that their initial fear that the sealers would riot was coming true. While the 
magistrates’ apprehensions were justified, the strikers only targeted people who refused 
to cooperate, or fellow workers who did not side with their movement. For instance, the 
local magistrates recorded a case where George Lilly, a local planter, was attacked for 
refusing to give into the sealers’ demands.165 William Evans attacked Lilly because the 
planter did not go to the meeting on Saddle Hill. Evans also berated Lilly based on past 
grievances related to a property dispute involving the ownership of ducks. The strikers 
saw such persons as traitors to their own class, and they demanded that all of the local 
sealers to stand together to force payment in cash. While the sealers may have met 
peaceably on Saddle Hill, they still relied on threats of violence to get their way. In this 
case, the strikers were much like the Harbour Grace servants who used threats of violence 
and acts of force to make people comply with their demands. 
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Tucker started an investigation into this attack on February 25th, when he held a 
court to question witnesses about the incident. He first questioned the crew who were 
onboard The Perseverance at the time of the attack.166 They stated that they were woken 
up by the sounds of construction on the ship and people shouting to one another. William 
Ewan, the captain’s first mate, went to investigate and discovered a hundred individuals 
who used hatchets and saws to take the schooner apart. He reported that the men 
dismantled the ship’s masts, gaffs, riggings and yards to prevent the schooner from 
leaving the harbour. The group of men forced Ewan below deck to prevent him from 
interfering, and the crewmember reported that at least six men with guns threatened to 
shoot him if he attempted to come up again. Both Ewan and his captain waited until the 
men were finished damaging the schooner before they left the vessel, which ended later 
that morning. Ridley later stated that the schooner required major repairs that cost him 
120 pounds and which took his workers months to complete.167  
Both the witnesses and the investigators suspected that the group that attacked 
Ridley’s schooner was sealers. While disgruntled workers may have perpetrated the 
attack, there are two characteristics of the group and their destruction of the merchant’s 
schooner that corroborated the court officials’ suspicions of sealers. Firstly, the group 
attacked The Perseverance days after Ridley refused to meet with the sealers.168 The 
merchant’s actions threatened to undo the sealers’ efforts to gain better wages because 
the masters amended their agreements with the sealers on the basis that all of the other 
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local ship owners would do the same. Ridley now had an advantage over the other ship 
owners because he did not have to guarantee his employees cash wages, but he could 
keep giving them credit in exchange for their seal pelts and oil. The other masters and 
merchants could have abandoned their new agreements with the sealers and returned to 
the old contracts, but the sealers responded quickly, and continued to hold out against 
their masters.  
The group also wanted Ridley to give into their demands because he was an 
influential merchant. The sealers signaled that if Ridley wanted to do business in the 
sealing industry he would have to play by the strikers’ rules. Ridley’s refusal to work 
with the sealers prevented a sizable group of the workers from being paid in cash wage 
and this threatened the strikers’ cohesion.169 Strikers could feel betrayed if they still had 
to rely on credit, while other sealers received a cash wage. The sealers relied on the 
promise that all of the strikers would gain equal benefits if they remained united and that 
their masters would acknowledge their labour through these new contracts. Without 
unity, the sealers lost their power to set the terms of their engagement. Individually, they 
would not have been able to get their wages increased by masters who held more 
economic and political clout. As such, the sealers had the most to benefit from attacking 
Ridley’s ship. It sent a message to Ridley and the other masters that resistance to their 
demands would not be tolerated. Tucker’s and the local magistrates’ suspicions were later 
confirmed when the sealers put up a placard taking credit for the attack.170 
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Tucker responded to the sealers’ actions by appointing special constables to be 
attached to the Carbonear and Harbour Grace authorities.171 He tasked the constables 
with keeping watch over the town to ensure that the strikers no longer made trouble. The 
new constables patrolled the two towns day and night to prevent the strikers from 
meeting together or from posting new placards. While the constables did not meet 
resistance or break up any illegal assemblies, they did tear down new placards that 
appeared in the towns. The constables also posted their own notices in prominent places 
which detailed the Chief Justice’s proclamations condemning the sealers’ attack against 
Ridley’s ship and asked for anyone who had information on the strikers’ illegal activities 
to step forward.172 The sealers continued to march together in solidarity against their 
masters and local suppliers, however, and called to their fellow workers to boycott the 
sealing hunt until everyone in Carbonear enjoyed a cash wage from this industry.173The 
sealers marched to each schooner and called to their fellow workers to resist their masters 
until they were paid in cash.  
Tucker’s measures failed to end the sealers’ strike, but it showed how the Chief 
Justice saw himself as a mediator in this situation. He didn’t act against the sealers until 
the strikers attacked an important merchant. Initially, he saw the sealing strike as the 
workers negotiating with their masters and local suppliers for better wages.174 Tucker did 
not intervene at this time because neither party had committed any crimes or disturbed 
the area’s peace. He did not believe that it was his duty to intervene into the local 
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economy or to command how people arranged master-servant contracts. Tucker wanted 
to stop the strikes from happening after Ridley’s ship was attacked, because he believed 
that the workers had committed a criminal act. Yet, Tucker failed to prevent the sealers 
from destroying property, attacking individuals or assembling. Instead, the sealers 
continued to resist their masters with peaceful meetings, while factions of these workers 
took it upon themselves to forcefully coerce the local ship owners.  
Tucker and the local magistrates failed to end the strikes, and the workers were 
successful in their resistance. The attack on Ridley’s ship and their subsequent actions 
demonstrated that they were united in their desire to gain better standards of living for 
their fellow workers. The strikers did not want to get of rid of the truck system all 
together, but they were able to gain a cash wage from the seal hunt.175 The sealers’ 
actions did not translate into further resistance against their masters’ use of the truck 
system in the cod fishery, because this economic system was ingrained into how this 
industry operated. The strikers did not articulate why they didn’t continue their resistance 
movement against their masters’ use of the truck system in the cod fishery, but their 
initial placards illustrated that they saw this initial strike against the ship masters as the 
first step in getting rid of Newfoundland’s debt system.176 However, the sealers were 
satisfied that they convinced their masters to amend their agreements and the movement 
faded. Perhaps the workers saw the seal hunt as a relatively new industry that could be 
changed by their actions, while they viewed the cod fishery as an established industry. 
The sealers knew that their masters could be pressured to make one-time cash payments 
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for the seal hunt, but not a cash wage in exchange for their catches of fish for a majority 
of the year. In this sense, the sealers acted like their counterparts from the Harbour Grace 
food riot by viewing their traditional paternalistic relationships, in this case the use of the 
truck system in the cod fishery, as something that was inherent in their lives.  
Although the sealers did not challenge the truck system within the cod fishery, 
this did not mean that this group was reactive like the anonymous petitioners or the 
Harbour Grace servants. Instead, the strikers show that the Conception Bay workers were 
pro-active in changing how the local economic and social systems impacted their lives. 
The sealers were aware of each other’s plights, and they recognized that they had enough 
collective power to challenge the state of affairs. The strikers had a unified identity as a 
working population and they had common experiences. The sealers used this common 
identity and the promise of a better livelihood to mobilize the working population to 
resist the ship masters.  
As with the anonymous petitioners and the Harbour Grace servants, the sealers 
used their numbers to pressure their masters and local suppliers to give into their 
demands. This did not mean that the sealers were the dominant force in Conception Bay, 
but that the masters and the local suppliers still had greater control over how the labour 
operated and could count on the state to support them. The sealers could only strike for a 
limited time before the authorities stepped in with harsher measures or before they 
threatened their own livelihood by not having enough currency to purchase provisions. 
Even though the masters and the local suppliers required that the seal hunt succeeded 
81 
 
each year to benefit from their investments, they could potentially survive if the sealers 
continued to strike as they had more access to money to purchase goods.177  
The 1832 sealers’ strike shows that the workers recognized that they had a 
common identity that they could draw upon to change how the system operated. The 
sealing strike offered unique circumstances compared to the two previous discussed 
cases. It changed how they acted as a group and how they responded to their masters’ 
methods of maintaining control over terms of employment. While the sealers used similar 
tactics to those of their prior counterparts, such as destroying property to make local 
suppliers comply with their demands, the workers used these methods in this instance to 
achieve different goals. What this illustrates is that the circumstances that 
Newfoundland’s workers faced determined how they went about achieving these goals. 
In particular, the sealers reacted to their masters’ history of exploiting their labour. 
Unlike the cases previously noted, the strikers did not respond to immediate situations 
that they deemed were unfair, but focused more readily on immediate economic 
improvement.  
The sealers believed that the strike was necessary to gain greater benefit from 
their labour. The shipmasters and the suppliers, on the other hand, believed the strike 
jeopardized their investments in the seal hunt. The major factor that caused the strike to 
occur was access to cash and its uneven distribution to the different classes on the island 
of Newfoundland. The seal hunt also did not have the same history as the cod fishery, 
which was reflected in how the workers acted. The cod fishery and its system of 
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obligations between masters and servants were ingrained into the residents’ life. The seal 
hunt, however, was relatively new to the island’s inhabitants and it did not present the 
same responsibilities that servants and masters felt towards one another. The strikers’ 
actions correlated with the other workers’ movements that occurred in the previous 
example, in which they protested unfair conditions that hampered their economic power. 
While it is not possible to know why the masters and the local suppliers agreed to the 
strikers’ demands, the evidence suggests that they wanted to end the strike quickly before 
the seals gave birth and the season was lost. As such, the sealing strike was settled by the 
workers’ protests and by their masters’ use of official channels to have their respective 
ideas of justice implemented.  
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Chapter Five: Resisting Gibbeting, 1834 
 In 1833 and 1834, the people of Conception Bay paid close attention to the 
murder trials of Peter Downing and Catherine Snow. These two cases reveal many of the 
problems that Newfoundland’s residents had with the justice system and the concerns that 
they had about the island’s political system. Roman Catholics, a majority of whom were 
Irish servants and fishers, enjoyed toleration towards their religion since 1779 and the 
authorities granted them the liberty to openly practice their faith in 1784.178 The Irish 
population also flourished since the late 18th century as more immigrants from Ireland 
arrived in Newfoundland. O’Flaherty stated that the Irish Roman Catholics outnumbered 
Newfoundland’s Protestant populations by the early 1800s.179 By 1832, the island’s 
Roman Catholics were spurred by Newfoundland’s new Representative Government and 
by political figures to continue their fight for greater representation. The Catholic 
population often translated their collective desire for greater access to Newfoundland’s 
government and legal systems by protesting the law officials’ decisions that they believed 
unjustly targeted their community. In many instances, the Roman Catholics were joined 
by fellow Protestant townspeople who also felt attacked by the authorities’ decisions 
when the officials applied blanket punishments against communities for an individual’s 
crime. The protests that occurred against legal authorities often acted as indicators for the 
underlying tensions that people felt at this time. 
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People in the towns of Harbour Grace and Port de Grave rallied together in two 
separate instances to protest their local magistrates’ decisions to gibbet the Catholic 
criminals, Downing and Snow; because they felt that the authorities were overstepping 
their bounds. The townspeople’s resistance to these punishments emphasized how 
Newfoundland’s working population felt alienated by this aspect of the island’s justice 
system. In particular, the magistrates’ decision to publicly display the corpses of 
Downing and Snow demonstrated to these communities that the Justices of the Peace saw 
settlers especially the Roman Catholic residents as potential criminals. As in the 
previously discussed cases, these two protests show that Newfoundland’s working 
population felt that their authorities were unjustly punishing Snow and Downing for their 
economic and social positions as well as their crimes. The townspeople and the 
authorities had different notions of appropriate punishment. Residents believed that 
gibbeting offenders was unreasonable since it punished a community for individuals’ 
crimes, while the legal officials saw it as an effective way to prevent people from 
harming one another by serving as a lesson. How people defined the law differently was 
exemplified by how the townspeople from Harbour Grace and Port de Grave resisted the 
local administration’s decisions to execute Downing and Snow.   
 The magistrates were motivated by external circumstances to publicly display the 
bodies of criminals. Bannister argued that the island’s authorities use of “[m]ercy and 
terror equally reinforced the rule of law and the established social order.”180 However, the 
magistrates decided what the correct conduct was based on political circumstances. 
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Officials used pardons to reinforce moral obligations and societal values that were 
threatened by outdated laws. In 1784, Governor Campbell, for example, pardoned Sarah 
Spry for the murder of her recently born child.181 Spry confessed that she murdered her 
child because the infant was conceived during an illicit affair. Campbell and the crown 
believed that Spry should receive mercy because the laws concerning infanticide were 
outdated. This did not mean that the Governor believed that Spry was innocent, but 
thought that she did not deserve to be executed for committing infanticide. Legal officials 
used pardons to set new legal standards or to reform current laws that reinforced 
traditions that were no longer supported by society.  
Newfoundland’s officials used acts of terror, on the other hand, to make people 
conform to morals and beliefs that authorities believed were necessary to preserve. The 
legal authorities used corporal punishments to inhibit what they saw as residents’ 
criminal tendencies. However, what the officials considered to be criminal included 
immoral acts that were not directly handled by the law. In 1820, Acting Governor Lt 
David Buchan ordered that two fishermen, James Lundrigan and Philip Butler, to be 
whipped for refusing to repay their debts and for not appearing in court.182Cadigan 
argued that Buchan punished Butler and Lundrigan not because of their debts, but 
because their wives refused to vacate their homes as ordered by the court and they 
threatened the constables who tried to confiscate their properties.183 Lundrigan and Butler 
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maintained that they did not give into the courts’ demands because their wives wanted to 
keep their homes. Cadigan suggested that Buchan saw the men’s choice to submit to their 
wives demands as their own failures, and thought that they should be punished for not 
acting as the patriarchs of their respective families. Cadigan saw Buchan’s choice to whip 
these two fishermen as a way to reinforce the message that men should act as the 
patriarchs of their families. While Campbell had earlier pardoned Spry as a way of 
reforming how the law operated, Buchan used corporal punishment as a means to 
reinforce both existing legal standards and the patriarchal values that he believed were 
important to society’s stability.  
The whipping of Lundrigan and Butler was not unique; officials used corporal 
punishment as a means to reinforce servant-master relationships. Naval surrogates and 
later magistrates used whipping or similar measures to punish unruly servants to ensure 
that other workers maintained their obligations to their masters.184 However, legal 
officials in Conception Bay often opted to use monetary fines instead of corporal 
punishments because they were easier to implement and the authorities felt that this 
offered better avenues for mediation between the opposing parties in court.185Authorities 
reserved corporal punishments as solutions to master-servant conflicts for what they 
considered heinous acts of disobedience. Legal officials rarely corporally punished 
masters for their discretions against their servants, but magistrates in Harbour Grace were 
known to fine employers who refused to pay their employees. This suggested that 
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Newfoundland’s judicial authorities saw punishment as a tool to instruct the working 
population and masters on how the economy and society should function. Magistrates 
also used capital punishment to reinforce existing power structures and societal standards, 
but the death penalties that they applied had more lasting and immediate impacts on 
communities. Executions were public spectacles for the local residents.  
Leading up to their sentencing, criminals were topics of interest in newspapers, as 
journalists and editors wrote lengthy stories. Michael Eamon argued that the print culture 
of British North America transcended the barriers of the literate and spread to the 
illiterate.186 People used public spaces, such as taverns, marketplaces or homes to 
disseminate the news that appeared in publication to those around them. It was common 
for individuals to read newspapers aloud to others, especially to people who could not 
read. Similarly Maudie Whelan argued that even though most of the island’s population 
was illiterate, newspapers were important in “shaping as well as reflecting Newfoundland 
society.”187 She argued that Newfoundland’s journalism was initially founded for the 
elite, as the island’s officials established local newspapers in 1807 to cater to the St. 
John’s merchants.188 John Ryan, an experienced editor who founded New Brunswick’s 
earliest newspapers, was chosen by Governor Sir Eramus Gower to create 
Newfoundland’s first news publication.189 At first, Ryan held a monopoly over 
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Newfoundland’s news cycle with the Royal Gazette and Newfoundland Advertiser, but 
more people created their own newspapers in response to political demands. For example, 
John Shea created the Newfoundlander in 1827 to argue for the “idea of a local 
legislature” for Newfoundland.190 
By 1834, newspapers of different political and religious affiliations existed in St. 
John’s and outside of the capital as well, such as Carbonear’s Star and Conception Bay 
Journal in 1834 and Harbour Grace’s Conception Bay Mercury in 1829.191 Whelan 
suggested that Newfoundland’s newspapers only appealed to a small readership, but the 
number of newspapers created and their popularity suggested otherwise. Little’s and 
O’Flaherty’s examination of Newfoundland’s education system suggested that more of 
the island’s population were becoming literate.192 While literacy was still relatively low 
among the working populations, Eamon’s arguments about how print culture was 
transferred show that the few people who could read shared what they learned with 
others. Newspapers were a popular method of getting the daily news by the elites and 
workers alike. This was especially shown by how many editorials newspapers received 
on murder cases, in which editors welcomed readers to discuss their opinions on the 
criminals.193 If the murderer was particularly infamous, editors published several issues 
that devoted lengthy stories on the trial proceedings.  
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Newspaper articles acted as windows into trials, which were also supplemented 
by local gossip. Community members shared news through word of mouth, as individuals 
recalled what they heard about the crimes or what their masters told them from what they 
read in the newspapers. Keough’s work on women’s use of violence and the courts 
corroborates this claim, as she stated that the island’s plebeian population learned what 
occurred in their communities from talking to one another. For instance, “Ellen Veal 
appeared before the justice…at St. Mary’s to lodge a complaint of assault against her 
neighbour Mary Bowen,” who attacked her based on rumors she heard about her 
family.194  
Crowds watched the authorities hang the guilty parties, thanks in part to the 
interest generated by newspapers. Newfoundland’s judges, particularly the Chief Justices, 
made these executions accessible to all community members. The magistrates and the 
naval surrogates encouraged individuals to watch these executions as a reminder that 
breaking the law had serious consequences. To accomplish this, the local authorities 
turned criminal executions into public humiliations of the criminals as their bodies were 
displayed for the crowds after they were hanged. Bannister noted that authorities 
publicized events by having the sheriff “convey them in public procession to the 
gallows…between ten in the morning and noon,” as they done for Edmund McGuire’s 
and Matthew Halluran’s hangings in 1754.195 Courts ensured that executions garnered 
attention by having them occur during the busiest time of the day. Like England’s courts, 
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Newfoundland’s authorities also used gibbetting to terrify the island’s residents into 
complying with the law. Legal officials hung criminals’ corpses in chains or in cages that 
held their bodies in public places. These devices were locked, to prevent friends or family 
members of the deceased from stealing the bodies and burying them. Gibbetted corpses 
would be hung from trees, gallows or other locations for long durations of time. In some 
cases, the executed criminals were displayed for months or years. The authorities tarred 
these corpses to prevent them from rotting and from animals eating the bodies.196 Part of 
what made gibbetting so offensive to the criminal’s loved ones was that the convicted 
were “denied a Christian burial” and were often buried next to the gallows or the gibbets 
that they hung from.197 
Authorities often had criminals’ bodies dissected prior to being gibbetted. David 
McNally argued that English officials ordered surgeons to perform operations on corpses 
in public places because it served as a means to discipline the working masses.198 
McNally showed that the authorities’ tactics to scare the English masses into submission 
failed because these public displays of corpses often enraged crowds. People fought with 
officials, or secretly stole the bodies to give them proper burials. For instance, he noted 
how Dr. Bernard Mandeville recorded in his observations on public hangings in Tyburn, 
England, that the crowds defiantly protested these punishments. In one instance, 
Mandeville stated that the people who witnessed the execution attacked the jailors who 
                                                                 
196
 Joseph R. Smallwood, Catherine F. Horan, Robert D.W. Pitt and Bertram G. Riggs, eds., Encyclopedia 
of Newfoundland and Labrador, vol. 2, s.v. “Giant Squid, Gibbons”, 519. 
197
 Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals,  214. 
198
 David McNally, Monsters of the Market, Zombies, Vampires and Global Capitalism (Boston: 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 2011), 19. 
91 
 
attended one hanging.199 Gibbetting had the opposite effect than the one that English 
officials hoped. The display of corpses angered people instead of making them more 
submissive. Newfoundland’s authorities, like their English counterparts, believed that 
public dissections caused people to fear the law because it showed how individuals who 
broke the law would be humiliated after their death. Newfoundland’s residents, like their 
English and Irish contemporaries, saw the body as sacred and to witness corpses being 
dissected, then hung in chains, served as a stark reminder that there were severe 
consequences for breaking the island’s law. Not only did Newfoundland’s residents find 
the gibbetted corpses disgusting, it also offended their sense of Christian decency. 
Newfoundland’s Roman Catholics and Protestants had their own graveyards located next 
to their churches. While these denominations remained separated on many questions, 
they shared the belief that the dead deserved a Christian burial.200 The residents viewed 
gibbetted corpses as symbols of injustice, since they believed that it was improper for the 
legal officials to leave bodies rotting out in the open, even if they were criminals.  
To fully understand how Newfoundland’s residents, particularly the people of 
Harbour Grace and Port de Grave, reacted to these public displays, it is important to 
discuss how they perceived Downey’s and Snow’s executions. Those two murder trials 
produced intense interest among people in Conception Bay. For instance, the newspaper 
editors of the Patriot, Dr. William Carson and Robert J. Parsons, and the 
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Newfoundlander, John Shea, each commented on these murders.201 People also wrote 
several editorials in the Patriot. While it is difficult to determine how much interest the 
working population had in these incidents, it can be speculated that the populations of 
these two towns would have talked to one another about these murders based on the 
interest shown in the newspapers and the attendance at the trials. 
 The people of Harbour Grace became deeply involved in the fates of Peter 
Downing and Patrick Malone after they were accused of murdering their master.202 In 
July of 1833, Harbour Grace’s residents and the authorities responded to a fire that 
occurred at Mr. Bray’s home.203 When the residents put out the fire, they discovered the 
remains of Bray, his child and one of his female servants. At first, the authorities believed 
that they had died in the fire, but upon closer inspection it was discovered that they had 
been murdered. How this was discovered, whether the people who responded to the fire 
saw visible signs of an altercation or if a surgeon performed an autopsy, was not revealed 
in the court records. What the authorities recorded, however, was that the investigators 
arrested two of Mr. Bray’s employees for their master’s murder. An article in the Patriot 
confirmed this. The author stated that the “perpetrators of the savage and diabolical deed, 
by which Mr. Bray his child and domestic [sic], met their melancholy end” were caught 
by the authorities.204 The constables and magistrates in Harbour Grace suspected that 
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Peter Downing and Patrick Malone murdered the three people to rob their master and 
then set fire to the house to hide their murders.205  
The authorities postponed the trial because they were uncertain of who committed 
the killings. Harbour Grace’s jailor, Mr. Currie, decided to take advantage of the two 
prisoners’ nervousness.206 The jailor isolated Downing and Malone to keep the prisoners 
from talking to one another. He then offered Malone a reprieve from being executed if he 
confessed about who murdered the residents of Bray’s home. Malone stated that the two 
initially planned to rob Mr. Bray while he was away. When Malone and Downing 
discovered that there were people still in the house, they killed the occupants to hide their 
crime. They then set fire to the house to cover their tracks. When the jailor asked who 
killed the residents of Bray’s home, Malone said that Downing murdered them while he 
assisted with the fire. The jailor was pleased with Malone’s confession and he assured the 
prisoner that the magistrates would be made aware that a plea bargain had been arranged 
between the two of them. Downing, on the other hand, did not receive a plea offer from 
the jailor. Instead, the prisoner confessed of his own accord when he heard that the 
authorities gave Malone a lenient sentence for his confession.207  
While Downing and Malone confessed soon after they were caught, they did not 
face trial until January 3rd, 1834. By that time, the murders of the three people became a 
popular topic of conversation amongst the people of Conception Bay. Chief Justice 
Henry Boulton advised the jury to consider that “one of the parties killed the deceased, it 
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is murder in both, and it is perfectly immaterial in the consideration of either prisoner’s 
case, which gave the mortal stroke” since both of them intended to harm Bray.208 The 
former Attorney General of Upper Canada, Boulton had only been appointed as 
Newfoundland’s Chief Justice months before.209 He had been a controversial figure 
before coming to Newfoundland. He actively sought to silence William Lyon Mackenzie 
King and to reverse that Upper Canada’s reformers’ efforts to gain greater representation 
because he believed that the colony benefited from Britain’s imperial authority.210 
Boulton’s agitations against Upper Canada’s Reformers caused the British Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Goderich, to recall him from his position and to place him as 
Newfoundland’s new Chief Justice in 1833. In his article comparing Frances Forbes’ and 
Boulton’s tenures as Chief Justices, John McLaren noted that Boulton made enemies 
when he sought to make sweeping changes that reaffirmed English common law on the 
island, where previous judges based some of their decisions on local customs. Boulton’s 
departure from other Chief Justices’ actions were not well received in Newfoundland, as 
he faced the “first six years of a reformed system of colonial governance with a 
representative assembly” and a Catholic population who were recently emancipated.211 
While Boulton was adamant in seeing English common law applied heartily in 
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Newfoundland, many segments of the population, including the island’s reformers and 
the Catholic population, resisted his efforts. Boulton’s remarks on Downing and Malone 
would later gain him notoriety amongst the Catholic population and the Reformers, as 
people believed that he was bigoted against the prisoners because they were Roman 
Catholics.  
The Patriot’s editor noted the full attendance at the St. John’s courthouse to see 
the trial.212 The prosecution convinced the jury to have the prisoners hanged by showing 
the jurors that Downing and Malone had confessed. The jury elected to have the two 
prisoners executed, to have their bodies dissected by a surgeon, and to have their remains 
gibbetted as a last recompense for their crimes.213 However, Boulton later excluded 
dissection from the list of Downing’s punishment and commuted Malone’s execution 
because of the earlier plea bargain.  
Both the Harbour Grace’s officials’ and Boulton’s actions during this trial 
prompted detractors of the administration to criticize the island’s legal system. One such 
critic was the Irish-born Roman Catholic Bishop Anthony Fleming, who chronicled 
Downing’s trial and execution as an example of the administration’s incompetence. 
Originally hailing from County Kilkenny, Ireland, Fleming arrived in Newfoundland in 
1823 as a priest under Bishop Scallan’s tutelage.214 Fleming earned Scallan’s respect as 
the bishop’s curate, in which he looked after the Parish of St. John’s. In October 1829 he 
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inherited Scallan’s position.215 Fleming used his position as Bishop of St. John’s to delve 
into political matters. John Fitzgerald argued that Fleming was an ultramontanist, who 
“desired to avoid secular “French”,”gallican”, “liberal” and “enlightenment” ideas, as 
well as Protestantism…in church affairs.”216 The Bishop’s view on how the church 
should be run influenced how he saw politics, particularly Irish rights. The Bishop 
backed the reformers’ efforts to help the Roman Catholics gain greater rights in 
Newfoundland, even though he considered them to be liberals.217 Both the reformers, 
headed by Dr. William Carson and Patrick Morris, and Fleming, believed that they could 
obtain their own ends by mobilizing people against the island’s largely English and 
largely Church of England administration. To gain support from the native-born and the 
Irish-born working classes, the reformers portrayed the British officials as harsh in 
administering the law. They argued that England’s colonial secretary should grant 
Newfoundland representative government to end the cycles of abuse that English 
authorities perpetrated against the residents. Carson and Morris, for example, publicly 
condemned Governor Buchan for having Lundrigan and Butler whipped.218 The 
reformers argued that Buchan’s punishment was unnecessary and that fines would have 
sufficed to punish the two fishermen. They used this case as an example of the naval 
surrogates’ overzealous use of whipping as a punishment for mundane offenses. 219 
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The Ledger’s editor, Henry Winton, considered Fleming to be a demagogue who 
used his position as a leader of the Roman Catholic community to support his political 
movements.220 While Winton also supported Irish rights, he feuded with the Bishop 
during the reformers’ bid for representative government for Newfoundland. Winton’s 
beliefs were complex, as he supported people gaining greater personal freedoms, such as 
Roman Catholic emancipation, and in “defending the established order of society” that 
governed over the island’s populace.221 Winton was a conservative and he clashed with 
people who he thought manipulated the working population for their own benefit. This 
did not mean that Winton wanted to protect his fellow residents from being manipulated, 
since he often berated workers for protesting against unfair economic conditions, but he 
disliked elites who pandered to the masses. In 1832, Winton criticized Fleming for using 
his position as a bishop to endorse candidates for the newly granted assembly. John Kent, 
a politician recommended by Fleming, asserted that Winton was bigoted against Irish 
Roman Catholics and Fleming retaliated by writing an article in the Newfoundlander 
stating that he was allowed as a citizen of the British Empire to support the potential 
politicians that he liked in the election.  
Winton’s remarks on Fleming did not deter the reformers from spurring the 
residents’ patriotism during the 1830s. When Peter Downing and Patrick Malone were 
sentenced, Fleming claimed that Newfoundland’s legal system was inherently biased 
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against Roman Catholics. While Newfoundland’s Roman Catholics had been allowed to 
practice their faith since 1779, large economic and social divisions still existed between 
the Protestants and Catholics. The island’s government largely consisted of British 
Protestants, while there was a small Irish Catholic minority that was able to gain 
positions within the local political scene. The Catholic population believed that the 
Protestant majority in the government negatively impacted their rights, as authorities 
upheld laws and made decisions that benefitted their own denomination. At the same 
time, the local officials believed that the Catholic leaders were using sectarian divisions 
to further their own power. For instance, Boulton objected to Fleming’s interference in 
politics, stating to the Colonial Office that he disagreed with the Bishop’s use of his 
position to create further sectarian divisions amongst the population.222  
Fleming considered the Chief Justice to be a “bigot and partisan,” who hated the 
Irish.223 McLaren argued that Boulton was a “Protestant, [but] he was not antithetical to 
Catholics.”224 Instead, Boulton’s hostile actions against the Catholics in Newfoundland 
were based on his experiences as Attorney General. In Upper Canada, Catholics were 
expected to respect the law, as Bishop Macdonnell taught them. However, 
Newfoundland’s Catholic population acted differently than their British North American 
cousins, since they resisted the law and its officials that persecuted them. Boulton 
observed how this was made worse by priests and bishops, such as Fleming, who 
aggravated their congregation to protest legal officials’ decisions with which they did not 
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agree with. This does not excuse Boulton’s bigoted actions against Catholics in 
Newfoundland, but it does explain why the Chief Justice saw this community as 
rebellious and seditious against English Common Law.  
The Colonial Secretary had appointed Boulton as Newfoundland’s Chief Justice 
because he viewed the former Upper Canada Attorney General as a man who held similar 
beliefs about Britain’s imperial authority as himself. Upon his arrival, Boulton was at 
odds with Newfoundland’s reformers and its Catholic communities. Boulton’s respect for 
British authority influenced him to alter the island’s legal system to conform more 
closely to English law. Boulton changed how Sheriffs chose juries to better resemble how 
English officials operated. The Chief Justice increased the pool of candidates from which 
the Sheriff could draw juries to oversee trials that occurred in the Supreme Court. 
However, Boulton mainly chose Protestants to act as these candidates, while only giving 
five potential seats to Roman Catholics.225  
Fleming argued that juries always had a pro-Protestant bias that disadvantaged 
Catholic prisoners, since Protestant elites viewed Irish workers as naturally violent and 
disorderly.226 O’Flaherty argued that Newfoundland authorities “worried about some kind 
of ‘faction’ existing among” Irish Catholics.227 Chief Justice Colclough, for example, 
referred to protestors during 1815 as Irish rioters because he believed that they were 
naturally violent and prone to drinking.228 Fleming further emphasized that 
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Newfoundland’s legal system was biased against Roman Catholics when he pointed out 
that most of the legal and administrative officials on the island were Protestant. The 
Bishop illustrated that Roman Catholics did not have equal representation in 
Newfoundland’s society. He pointed out that all of the prisoners, an estimated 40 
criminals, charged with crimes before the Supreme Court were Roman Catholics.229All of 
the criminals executed by authorities during the 1830s were Irish Catholics.  
Fleming publicly allied himself with Caron’s and Morris’ reformers in response to 
the administration’s apparent abuses of the Catholic population. With their combined 
efforts, the reformers and Fleming brought to light the Harbour Grace officials’ and the 
Supreme Court’s actions during Downing’s trial. In particular, Fleming noted that the 
Harbour Grace officials unlawfully acquired both Malone’s and Downing’s 
confessions.230 The Bishop argued that the jailor was not allowed to offer Malone a plea 
bargain for his confession without approval from the Chief Justice to offer the prisoners 
pardons. Fleming also noted that the jailor was not allowed to offer the plea bargain to 
Malone first and then Downing, because it created an unequal opportunity for one 
prisoner to blame the other. The jailor contravened English common law at the time.  
The Bishop’s accusations were later followed up by Thomas Cochrane, 
Newfoundland’s Governor. By 1825, Cochrane’s 26 year career as a Royal Navy officer 
and earned him the appointment as Newfoundland’s first resident governor. Cochrane 
was known for his opposition to Fleming’s political activities, as he believed that the 
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bishop was stirring up the island’s Irish population against him. For instance, Cochrane 
brought a “libel action…against the bishop’s chaplain, Father Edward Troy, for allegedly 
writing a series of articles against the governor” in the Patriot.231 Troy argued that 
Cochrane was purposely blocking Catholics from the government and that his bigotry 
was holding the Irish people back.232 Cochrane believed that Troy acted on Fleming’s 
behalf and the governor acted to have the bishop removed. Fleming also wanted 
Cochrane removed from his position and sought the people’s support to do so. In 1834, 
Fleming supported the reformers’ petition to have Cochrane leave Newfoundland.233 The 
feud between Cochrane and Fleming influenced their actions as they each attempted to 
have the other removed from Newfoundland.  
 The Governor released his own report on the Harbour Grace and the Supreme 
Court officials’ actions. Cochrane wrote to E.G. Stanley, the British colonial secretary, in 
March 1834, that several judges and constables from Harbour Grace had overstepped 
their legal authority. The Governor reported to Stanley that he started an internal 
investigation after Fleming accused the administration for abusing its power. Cochrane 
corroborated Fleming’s claims that the town’s officials, particularly the jailor, 
“overstepped their authority” and that the Supreme Court’s judges were complicit in 
these acts.234 He agreed that Downing was wrongfully executed and that Boulton should 
have waived Malone’s pardon. Cochrane reported that he had reprimanded the Harbour 
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Grace officials by docking their pay. The Governor, however, did not punish Boulton and 
the other Supreme Court justices because he did not want to tarnish the integrity of the 
island’s legal system.235  
While Cochrane’s report was never released to the public, Fleming made his 
accusations known. People in Harbour Grace were inspired by Fleming’s words to view 
Downing’s execution and gibbetting as a major affront to their sense of justice. The 
townspeople of Harbour Grace collectively came together on April 29th to steal back 
Downing’s corpse.236 The local magistrates recorded that people from the town 
dismantled Downing’s gibbet by cutting down the gallows and the chains that held the 
body. One magistrate wrote that there “must have been at least one thousand men in 
attendance on the night Downey’s body were removed and that they composedly 
walked… past the court house.”237 The difficulty of this task reveals that the crowd’s 
actions were premeditated, as they required the correct tools to cut the chains that held 
Downing’s corpse and they struck the gibbet when the authorities were asleep or unaware 
that anyone had trespassed onto the hill. The group then paraded the criminal’s body 
across town to Dr. Stirling’s home.238 The townspeople then deposited Downing’s corpse 
with a note that threatened the magistrate to bury this body or the crowd would cause 
trouble. After they accomplished this task, the group dispersed. When Stirling discovered 
the body and the note, he complied with the townspeople’s wishes and buried Downing 
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in the wreckage of Bray’s home to satisfy the Chief Justice’s commands to have the 
criminal’s corpse face the scene of his crime.  
The Harbour Grace townspeople’s actions demonstrated how Downing’s 
execution was a major issue for the residents of the island. The people came to the 
defense of a convicted murderer because they saw his body as a symbol of the tyranny of 
Newfoundland’s justice authorities. In particular, the protestors resisted the authorities’ 
decision to gibbet Downing because they believed that it unjustly targeted them for 
crimes that an individual committed. Sectarianism also played a part, as people viewed 
the authorities’ execution of Downing as another act against the Catholic community. 
The records do not state whether this protest was committed entirely by Roman Catholic 
residents or if it was a mixed group of outraged people, but Downing’s trial and 
execution demonstrated to the Catholic population how they were unfairly seen by the 
Protestants in power as naturally born criminals. The townspeople’s collective act of 
resistance showed how people did not feel that they could trust nor approach their local 
officials with their concerns. Instead, they took to the streets to have their voices heard on 
what they considered to be just and how the law should be implemented. In this case, the 
townspeople were successful in overturning the officials’ decision to hang Downing’s 
corpse near the town as a form of deterrent to keep people from breaking the law. The 
next chapter shows how the common people often turned to themselves, instead of their 
local magistrates or Supreme Court officials, to have what they believed to be justice 
implemented.  
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Chapter Six: Catherine Snow, 1834 
At the same time that Downing and Malone were accused of killing the three 
residents of the Bray’s home, Conception Bay’s residents were interested in the murder 
of John Snow. Port de Grave’s Catholic population targeted local law officials during 
their protest against the authorities’ orders to execute, dissect and gibbet Catherine 
Snow.239 John Snow was a Port de Grave planter who people considered as a pillar of the 
community. When his family reported him missing on August 31, 1833, neighbours 
immediately began a search.240 The Newfoundlander published an extensive article on the 
authorities’ investigation into Snow’s murder on January 23rd, 1834. The author reported 
that Robert John Pinsent Esq., a neighbour was called upon by Mr. Jacob, a local 
merchant and conservator of the Peace, to help look for the missing planter. Jacob stated 
to Pinsent that “he was supposed by the people either to be murdered, or that he had made 
away with himself.”241 When they investigated Mr. Snow’s fish flake in Port de Grave, 
they suspected that he was murdered. Arthur Spring, John Snow’s servant, indicated that 
fish were strewn about the flake and that he suspected his master was robbed. Pinsent 
also found blood that led from the fish flake to the nearby shore, which the investigators 
suspected meant that the missing planter’s body had been thrown into the sea. 
Suspecting foul play, Pinsent and his fellow investigators questioned Catherine 
Snow about her husband’s disappearance. Mrs. Snow recalled how on August 31st, John 
Snow and herself returned to their house by sundown from delivering fish to Messrs. 
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Martin & Jacob. They brought with them Tobias Mandeville to do their accounts. Mrs. 
Snow mentioned how her husband became angry when he learned that his daughters went 
with their other servant, Catherine White, to visit Mr. Hele’s wake in Cupids. Spring and 
Mandeville left to look for the Snows’ daughters, while John Snow threatened his wife’s 
and their children’s lives if they did not return. Catherine reported that John expressed his 
anger by firing his gun on their porch and that he soon left afterwards to search for their 
children. That was the last time Catherine saw her husband, as she quickly left with her 
youngest child to stay at her sister’s-in- law house.  
Pinsent recalled that Jacob and his fellow authorities arrested Spring on 
September 5th as a suspect of John Snow’s disappearance. Jacob believed that the two 
men were guilty and he laid a trap by “secrete [sic] a man under the magistrates’ desk to 
hear any conversation that might take place between the two” while they saw one another 
in the jailhouse.242 However, the prisoners discovered the hidden man as they talked 
about Snow’s murder. Arthur Spring confessed soon after, stating that he, Mandeville and 
Catherine Snow had plotted to kill John Snow a month before his disappearance. Initially, 
Mandeville asked Spring to help him murder Snow, claiming that the servant should get 
his revenge against his master for beating him. Catherine Snow also approached the 
servant and she agreed to help get rid of her husband.  
Contrary to Catherine Snow’s earlier statement, Spring stated that John Snow left 
to pick up Mandeville by himself, instead of leaving to go find his daughters. Catherine 
gave Spring her husband’s gun and she told him to go meet Mandeville at John Snow’s 
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fish flake. Spring then indicated that Catherine sent her two oldest daughters and 
Catherine White to Mr. Hele’s wake. When the servant arrived at the fish flake, he found 
that he could not shoot John Snow. He said that Mandeville took the gun from him and 
shot Mr. Snow in the chest, where he dropped dead on the stage. The two men then tied a 
grapnel to Snow’s body and dumped his corpse in the middle of the bay. Mandeville 
corroborated Spring’s account in his own confession, but he argued that he did not fire 
the gun. Instead, Spring shot John Snow and the servant told Mandeville he was pleased 
that he got his revenge. Similar to the Downing and Malone murder case, the authorities 
were unsure who committed the killing because the only evidence that they had of John 
Snow’s murder was the prisoners’ confessions.  
Authorities arrested Catherine Snow soon after Spring and Mandeville implicated 
her in their murder of her husband. While Spring reported that Catherine was a willing 
accomplice, Mandeville claimed that she was the mastermind behind her husband’s 
death. However, Catherine defended her original story when authorities interviewed her 
in jail. Catherine stated that she was only aware of Spring’s and Mandeville’s murder of 
her husband after they were arrested. The local magistrates believed that all three of the 
prisoners were guilty based upon the circumstantial evidence of Spring’s hatred for his 
master and Mandeville’s affair with Catherine.  
Conception Bay’s residents were interested in John Snow’s murder because of the 
nature of the crime. People were appalled that a servant killed a prominent planter, and 
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the involvement of the planter’s wife made it more sensational.243 People believed that 
Mandeville and Spring were guilty, but some were not convinced that Catherine Snow 
helped to murder her husband. They saw that the authorities had only circumstantial 
evidence against Catherine, and believed that the authorities based their conclusion of the 
woman’s guilt on her affair with Mandeville.  
 The Supreme Court and the jury did not share this view. On January 23rd, 1834, 
the three suspects appeared before the court. The prosecution presented its case that 
Mandeville, Spring and Snow colluded to kill John Snow. While there was no solid 
evidence that the three accused committed the crime, the jury believed that the 
circumstances surrounding their actions and the murder were connected.244 Namely, the 
jury accepted the witnesses’ statements that Mandeville and Spring plotted John Snow’s 
murder as true. Catherine Snow was also implicated because of her affair with 
Mandeville. People viewed her as an immoral adulteress who was capable of killing her 
husband. Snow’s daughters, who told the court that their parents were fighting, further 
emphasized that Catherine hated her husband.   
While the prosecution presented little physical evidence that the three were 
involved, the jury believed that Mandeville, Spring and Catherine Snow murdered the 
missing planter. The only physical evidence that the prosecution delivered was the blood 
found on the fish flake. It was enough evidence, including the confessions, for the jury to 
declare the “fatal verdict ‘Guilty’ against all the prisoners” and that they were to be 
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executed in Port de Grave the day after the trial occurred.245 Catherine Snow’s sentence, 
however, was commuted when the authorities discovered that she was pregnant. Chief 
Justice Boulton decided to keep Snow in jail until she delivered her baby and then have 
her executed in St. John’s.  
Boulton’s decision to delay Catherine Snow’s execution gave the public time to 
react to the circumstances surrounding the jury’s verdict. The number of people who 
believed that Snow was innocent grew after the trial, and many people criticized the 
justices for sentencing a woman based on circumstantial evidence.246 The biggest critic of 
the Supreme Court’s decision to kill Snow was Fleming’s personal aide, and an 
annoyance to the government authorities, Father Troy. The priest visited Snow in jail to 
provide her spiritual assistance before her execution and came to believe that Snow was a 
dutiful Catholic who was innocent.247 Like Fleming, Troy argued that the court sentenced 
Catherine Snow based on her actions during and after John Snow’s disappearance, 
instead of basing their conclusions on the evidence.  
Troy claimed that there was no solid evidence that Catherine Snow was involved 
in the murder. He believed that the jury, five of whom were Protestants, convicted Snow 
because she was a Roman Catholic.248 Many Protestants largely associated Catholics with 
Irish stereotypes, including that these people were naturally violent and immoral.249 Troy 
argued that when the jury heard that Snow committed adultery they concluded that she 
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likely murdered her husband. It is hard to determine if the jury actually acted this way, 
but Troy’s argument emboldened people to criticize the administration for their unfair 
bias against Catholics. People submitted editorials to the Patriot and the Newfoundlander 
arguing that Snow was innocent. One person wrote to the Newfoundland Patriot that 
people had the “deepest sympathy for the wretch thus doomed to suffer law’s last 
punishment after having now for many months endured that most intense of human 
miseries.”250 Another writer argued that Boulton should have told the jury to “divest their 
minds of every prejudice, and found their verdict simply upon such portions of the 
evidence as were in law admissible as against her.”251 People continued to argue that 
there was no solid evidence that indicated that Snow was involved in any way, but that 
the jury decided that she was guilty based on her behavior. Different editorialists stated 
that the Court’s decision to execute Snow was another example that Newfoundland’s 
administration was biased against Catholics. 
It is hard to determine why exactly the jury believed that Catherine Snow was 
guilty, but the court’s decision to execute her encouraged people to believe Fleming’s and 
Troy’s arguments. Troy and the other editorialists effectively demonstrated that the 
authorities only had circumstantial evidence to support their claims that Snow assisted the 
two other men accused in killing her husband. The priest gained 300 signatures for his 
petition to have the authorities retry Snow.252 The priest argued in his memorial that she 
had suffered enough while imprisoned and that she had eight daughters to look after. 
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Additionally, he stated that the jury unfairly judged the evidence and that new proof was 
available that showed Snow was innocent. The Chief Justice agreed, and set July 18th as 
the date that he would accept new evidence. Troy also sent a memorial to Governor 
Cochrane to ask that Snow’s trial be held in London before the English Supreme Court. 
Cochrane did not reply to this petition, and on July 21st Catherine Snow was executed in 
St. John’s.253 The Newfoundland Patriot wrote that Snow continued to believe that the 
authorities would show her mercy and asked the priest attending to her “Ah, sir is there 
no hope?”254 Moments before her death, Snow continued to profess her innocence to the 
authorities, but she was never given any respite.  
While the authorities did not record any incidents that occurred during the 
execution, they documented a protest that happened after the hanging. On July 21st, the 
authorities transported Snow’s body from St. John’s to Port de Grave to have her 
dissected and gibbetted in the town where she supposedly committed her crime. The 
surgeon Edward Kielley was selected to perform the dissection. Kielley learned how to 
be a surgeon while in Newfoundland from Daniel Coughlan in 1814 and he honed his 
craft in the Royal Navy. By 1826, Kielley had befriended Cochrane and the Governor 
appointed him as the surgeon for St. John’s jail replacing the political reformer William 
Carson. O’Flaherty stated that Kielley “professed a desire to stay away from political 
matters,” but as a Roman Catholic he sought greater rights for his fellow practitioners.255 
Some Catholics and reformers saw Kielley as an enemy because of his appointment, even 
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though he was a fellow Roman Catholic. Kielley’s political indifference would soon be 
challenged after his summer appointment when he recalled to Cochrane how he faced 
significant trouble conducting his dissection of Catherine Snow.256 Kielley reported to the 
Governor that the community was greatly agitated when Snow’s body arrived. The 
surgeon refused to follow the court’s orders to dissect the corpse in public because he 
feared that the people would attack him. 
The surgeon’s fears were well founded. When the authorities delivered Snow’s 
body to Kielley, the town’s Catholic priest formed a group of people to march to the jail 
to retrieve the woman’s body.257 Once the protestors reached Kielley’s place of work, 
they demanded that the surgeon release her remains to them. The surgeon feared that the 
protestors would attack him and he made a single cut to the body’s neck to fulfill his 
obligation to dissect the criminal’s corpse. As Kielley reported to Cochrane when he 
defended himself for not completing Catherine Snow’s dissection, “with all due attention 
[he] performed that duty so far as the…circumstances” allowed him.258 The protestors 
then took the body to a local Catholic cemetery, where the priest celebrated a final mass 
for Snow and buried her. After they accomplished their task, the protestors dispersed and 
returned to their homes.  
Port de Grave’s Catholic community felt that the law officials unfairly mistreated 
them by executing Catherine Snow. The protestors believed that the island’s authorities 
were punishing them as a town and as a religious community because of Snow’s 
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infidelity. As in the case of in Harbour Grace, the Port de Grave protestors resisted 
authorities’ attempts to have the body gibbetted in their town. The actions of these two 
groups of protestors suggest that they saw the display of these corpses as indecent, and 
that it went against their beliefs that bodies should be respected. This corresponds with 
McNally’s descriptions of English protests against authorities executing and gibbetting 
criminals. He argued that the protestors were not satisfied until the law officials respected 
the deceased by placing them in the proper graveyards.259 Newfoundland’s residents were 
no different; they believed that the authorities unduly punished them and tarnished their 
ideas of justice by displaying corpses of executed criminals.  
The protests against Downing’s and Snow’s executions demonstrate that the two 
communities did not agree with the court’s implementation of the law. Both the Harbour 
Grace townspeople and the Port de Grave Catholics saw justice differently than the 
authorities. To the protestors, justice was about fair treatment; individuals should pay for 
their actions, but whole communities should not suffer because of the actions of 
individuals. This was reflected in both the Harbour Grace townspeople and Port de Grave 
protestors who buried the executed criminals because they did not want to be subjected to 
the indecent exposure of decaying corpses. They saw gibbetting as a communal 
punishment.260 Yet, the government’s power was not absolute, and the people, especially 
Catholic residents, fought the administration and the merchants to have their concepts of 
justice acknowledged. While it is impossible to accurately determine if entire groups of 
people felt similarly about how justice should be implemented, the actions of various 
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groups during the 1815-1840 period suggested that they held common ideals or at least 
similar goals.  
When we compare the townspeople’s actions in the Snow case to the other 
examples of collective resistance discussed above, a pattern can be seen. Newfoundland’s 
residents resisted the local authorities when these officials indirectly punished whole 
communities for the actions of a few. The authorities during the 1816-17 food riots and 
the 1834 protest against Downing’s gibbetting punished the town’s residents because 
they believed that the working populations were likely to commit crimes.261 As McNally 
argued, courts used major crimes as opportunities to discipline their subjects into 
submission, instead of using the law to only punish the offenders.262 In this case, the 
Harbour Grace and Supreme Court authorities made Downing into an example of what 
happened if people broke the law. However, the townspeople saw his gibbetted corpse as 
a symbol of how their legal officials unjustly punished them for their position in society. 
The officials’ efforts to discipline the entirety of Harbour Grace resulted in people from 
different backgrounds coming together to resist the local magistrates. Unlike the 
previously discussed cases, the magistrates recorded that the townspeople acted together 
to have the local authorities bury Downing’s corpse.263 In the cases I discussed above, the 
legal officials often referred to protestors as a single group within communities. For the 
1816-17 Harbour Grace food riots, the court clerk and the other magistrates called the 
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protestors “rioters” or a “mob.”264 During the 1832 Sealers Strike, the magistrates stated 
that it was only the sealers who organized the strike and who attacked Ridley’s ship.265  
The only other time that the authorities referred to the protestors as “townspeople” 
was in 1815.266 In that case there was no evidence to indicate which group within St. 
John’s drafted and posted the petition to the courthouse. Chief Justice Colclough, 
however, believed that it was the Irish population of the community who protested 
against his order to have the dogs exterminated. Yet, in this case, it seemed the 
townspeople of Harbour Grace acted collectively. While the magistrates’ documents do 
not objectively record the events, they support the idea that different factions within the 
town collectively resisted the authorities and solved a common problem. Sectarianism did 
not constantly divide communities, since people of different religions and classes in 
Harbour Grace came together to resist authorities. Even though, Downing’s execution did 
not necessarily unite the people together into a community, they felt that something 
needed to be done to solve this problem.  
The Harbour Grace townspeople collectively saw this as an extreme circumstance 
that required them to respond to it as a community, instead of as separate factions. In the 
instance of Snow’s execution, sectarianism brought the Catholic population of Port de 
Grave closer together as they relied on one another to fight back against what they saw as 
the authorities’ decision to punish them for their beliefs. The Catholics were not united 
together based on an emergency that threatened their town’s sense of decency, but they 
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came together as a religious group to defend their right to practice their denomination and 
their religious identity. The sectarianism of these conflicts demonstrated how class and 
ethnic identities were also tied to people’s religious identities. Protestors in Port de 
Grave, and to some extent in Harbour Grace, perceived the authorities as attacking their 
sense of decency because they were Irish and working people. While not all of 
Newfoundland’s working population were Irish, the majority of them were and the 
island’s officials often associated stereotypes of criminal tendency of Ireland’s 
inhabitants with the lower classed. People were frustrated with the legal system and its 
authorities as they believed that the Protestant elite who held the majority of the 
government positions looked down on them as natural born criminals.  
The Harbour Grace and Port de Grave people’s protests against the executions of 
Downing and Snow were about more than frustrations with the legal system. While the 
protestors were focused on correcting what they saw as injustices perpetrated against 
them by the local authorities, the townspeople were also aware of the greater implications 
of these executions. In particular, both groups participated in acts of collective resistance 
because they wanted to show the authorities that they would no longer stand to be 
submissive. They realized that if they did not resist the Supreme Court judges’ and the 
magistrates’ decisions to execute these criminals that their rights as individuals would 
deteriorate as the authorities would continue to subject them to blanket punishments to 
deter them from crime. The Harbour Grace and Port de Grave protestors wanted to 
protect their social standing within Newfoundland’s society by resisting actions that 
threatened their ideas of morality and decency. At the same time, the Catholic 
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communities within these towns, and in the larger Avalon region, wanted greater rights to 
prevent the Protestants who dominated Newfoundland’s government from subjecting 
them to unfair punishments based on their religious denomination or ethnic background. 
Many of the island’s Irish and native Catholics were steadfast in believing that the 
Protestants were bigoted against them because of their cultures’ past conflicts. The court 
records and the newspaper accounts, particularly the editorials, confirm that these 
perceptions existed on both sides of these sectarian conflicts.  
How either group mistrusted the other prevented the protestors and the authorities 
from communicating effectively with one another. The townspeople and the Catholic 
populations felt that they had to take matters into their own hands to defend their social 
and political identities from the authorities’ actions. While Newfoundland’s courts were 
never battlegrounds in the cases discussed in this thesis, they were contested terrains. 
Where law authorities used official channels to have their definition of the law 
implemented, the Harbour Grace and Port de Grave townspeople circumvented the legal 
system by taking to the streets to have their own voices heard. Newfoundland’s working 
population on the Avalon considered the executions of Downing and Snow to be 
important as they protested to protect their social and political identities.  
The protestors also collectively resisted the authorities’ decisions because they 
wanted to determine their place in Newfoundland’s changing society. Much like the 
earlier cases discussed, the island’s residents perceived that major changes were taking 
place on Newfoundland. Where earlier protestors were worried about underlying 
economic tensions that occurred after the end of the Napoleonic War in 1815, the 
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Harbour Grace and Port de Grave townspeople were concerned about their social and 
political identities after Newfoundland was granted Representative Government in 1832. 
At this time, the island’s Catholic population was spurred on by their religious leaders, 
such as Fleming, and the reformers to seek greater rights. Newfoundland’s political and 
social dimensions underwent major changes that the working population adapted to by 
fighting for greater power. Downing’s and Snow’s bodies represented more than the 
people’s frustrations with Newfoundland’s legal system. They each stood as symbols of 
the working population’s efforts to fight for greater rights and to find their place in 
Newfoundland’s new social and political orders.
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Conclusion 
Each of the conflicts discussed in this thesis show how different groups 
interpreted what was fair and how they reacted to their respective circumstances. When 
the cases are examined together, it becomes clear that Newfoundland’s working 
population collectively resisted more than just the island’s legal system and its local 
authorities. Instead, the acts of collective resistance that occurred from 1815 to 1840 
demonstrated how the island’s residents were working together to protect their 
livelihoods or to gain better rights when Newfoundland experienced major economic, 
political, social and legal changes. The workers’ acts of collective resistance can be seen 
as major indicators of what underlying concerns people were most worried about. As 
such, Newfoundland’s working population fought against the legal authorities because 
they were both frustrated with the officials’ decisions and were worried about their place 
in the island’s changing society.  
In 1815, anonymous petitioners threatened the St. John’s magistrates with protests 
if they refused to rescind their orders to have the town’s dogs exterminated. The 
petitioners believed it was unfair that the authorities would kill their dogs on the behest of 
the principal inhabitants, while the officials saw it as their duty to react to this threat and 
to protect the town. The evidence suggests that the administration did not go through with 
its plan, because they feared that the town’s poor would protest their actions.  
In 1816-17, the Harbour Grace fishing servants marched on merchant’s stores and 
houses during a winter of starvation. The servants felt betrayed by their masters because 
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the local administration chose to have them shipped off the island rather than grant them 
winter supply as merchants and planters had in previous seasons. The Harbour Grace 
magistrates, on the other hand, feared that there was not enough food in the town to feed 
everyone, and that the servants would riot if they were not fed. The fishing servants based 
their appeal for provisions on paternalism and their masters’ obligation to feed them 
under the truck system, even though the town’s supplies of food dictated that this was not 
possible. The workers’ act of collective resistance from 1815 to 1817 indicated that the 
residents of the Avalon were concerned by their economic rights after the fishery 
declined in 1815.  
The protestors in St. John’s and Harbour Grace protested the authorities’ 
decisions because they felt that their traditional rights were threatened. Already in a 
precarious position, the servant population did not agree with the island’s elite that they 
should give up their rights to own dogs or to forgive their masters’ debts to them to 
prevent what the officials saw as immediate crises. Both groups, the workers and the 
authorities, viewed the dangers of these underlying economic tensions at this time, but 
they believed that different approaches should be implemented. In this case, the workers’ 
efforts to overturn the authorities’ decisions were successful as they protected their 
traditional rights.  
In 1832, Carbonear sealers and the owners of vessels fought over the nature of 
their compensation. The sealers argued that it was unjust that their masters and local 
suppliers benefitted more from their labour than they did, by paying them their share of 
the voyage in goods rather than cash. The workers used this argument to justify their 
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attack on Thomas Ridley’s ship, because he refused to accept their demands. The 
magistrates, however, saw the sealers’ attack as a breach of the peace and that they 
needed to protect the public. Even though the local officials cracked down on the strikers’ 
actions, the sealers convinced their masters to grant them a cash wage. Much like the 
earlier protests from 1815 to 1817, the sealers collectively came together to protect their 
livelihoods during a time great of economic stress. Instead of protecting their traditional 
rights, the workers in this case fought for more rights to give them greater advantages in 
Newfoundland’s changing economic atmosphere. The first three cases discussed in this 
thesis demonstrated how workers were concerned with the economy during the early 
1800s after the fishery declined and how this fear still plagued them well into the later 
1830s. To protect their livelihoods, workers came together to form strikes to seek greater 
economic pursuits from their masters and the local merchants.  
In 1834, Harbour Grace’s townspeople and Port de Grave’s Catholic population 
protested the administration’s decision to execute and gibbet two criminals. Harbour 
Grace’s townspeople were angered that the officials publicly displayed Peter Downing’s 
corpse in their town after he was executed. The residents saw the execution and 
gibbetting of Downing as a symbol of how officials abused their power. The 
administration believed that it was just to gibbet criminals’ corpses since it served as 
deterrence from further criminal behavior from the island’s working population. The 
townspeople responded by cutting Downing’s corpse down, and forcing the town’s 
magistrates to bury his body.  
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Similar events took place in Port de Grave, when the community’s Catholic 
residents were angered by the authorities’ execution and gibbetting of Catherine Snow.  
Port de Grave’s Catholic residents saw Snow’s execution as another example of the 
administration’s failure to treat their denomination fairly. They looked to the leadership 
of Bishop Fleming, who sided with political reformers in their portrayal of the English 
administration as cruel toward the native born Catholics and the Irish immigrant alike. 
The townspeople rallied together under the local Catholic priest to liberate Snow’s body 
from the surgeon before he could complete his dissection of her corpse. The Catholic 
protestors were only satisfied when Snow was given a proper burial, which they believed 
was the right thing to do. Newfoundland’s legal authorities, on the other hand, saw 
Snow’s execution and gibbetting as necessary to reinforce the message that immoral 
behavior would not be tolerated. The evidence suggests that the authorities and the jury 
agreed to execute Snow because she was motivated to kill her husband because of her 
affair with Mandeville. As such, the authorities wanted to make an example of Snow to 
demonstrate to the island’s residents that the rule of law and of common decency, in this 
case wives’ loyalty to their husbands, should not be broken. The protests against 
Downing’s and Snow’s executions were different from the other cases because they show 
how the island’s classes disputed over ideas of morality, as well as economic equality.  
Where the earlier cases showed how Newfoundland’s working population were 
concerned with the island’s economy, the people’s protests against the executions of 
Downing and Snow demonstrated how they were later worried about their identities in 
the island’s society. Newfoundland’s adoption of the Representative Government in 
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1832, in tandem with Catholics seeking greater rights during the 1800s, created 
underlying social and political tensions. Workers wanted to determine where they stood 
in Newfoundland’s changing society as they fought for greater social and political rights. 
In this case, the townspeople of Harbour Grace and the Catholic population of Port de 
Grave fought against authorities to prevent the local officials from giving out blanket 
punishments to deter crime. At the same time, the protestors wanted to ensure that their 
social and political power was protected from what they perceived as further abuse from 
Newfoundland’s government.  
Each of these cases of Newfoundland’s working population collective resistance 
of their authorities, masters or the elite indicated what people were concerned about. 
Court records and the newspapers are windows into how people perceived their 
economic, social and political positions during a time when the island’s society was 
changing. While these documents were written mainly by the elite, what the records do 
and do not say was important in ascertaining how people acted upon these underlying 
tensions. How Newfoundland’s residents dealt with their concerns as a group translated 
into how they defined justice and implemented the law. Sometimes these ideals were 
shared. Everyone agreed that the rule of law was necessary to keep society together, but 
these groups differed with one another when their definitions of justice threatened the 
others’ livelihoods or perceptions of morality. While Newfoundland’s classes did not 
directly state how they defined justice, their actions as groups show what they valued 
most, and how they thought these morals should be upheld.  
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